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Abstract
This article discusses the historical, cultural, and philosophical values that have helped mold
modern China and its powerful and thriving economy, and examines how they have helped shape
and influence China's current Anti-Monopoly Law, which has been in effect since 2008. China's
Anti-Monopoly Law reveals China's continuing commitment to honoring and following its tradi-
tional Confucian ethics and morals in regulating behavioral and structural competition issues.
Rather than following a western neoclassical economic approach, China is pursuing an evolutionary
approach in its Anti-Monopoly Law that emphasizes Confucian norms of morality, ethics, fairness,
and reciprocity, and the importance of economic diversity, variation and multiplicity. The article
explains why continuing cries for China to "get in step" with western neoclassical economic theory
are likely to fall on deaf ears.
I. Introduction
In August 2007, the People's Republic of China (PRC), through its National People's
Congress, enacted its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which first took effect in August 2008.1
Areas of concern include "Monopoly Agreements," 2 "Abuses of Dominant Positions," 3
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University of South Dakota School of Law. The author wishes to thank Tom Geu, Spencer Waller, James W.
Brock, Peter Carstenson, Maurice Stucke, Barry Vickrey, Jenny Xiaojin Huang, and Tie Hu for their helpful
comments and inspiration. The author also wishes to thank Teresa Carlisle, Jeffrey Schaefer, and Ashlee
Wendt for their able and assiduous efforts.
1. For excellent discussions of the history of China's AML, see CHINA'S ANTI-MONOPoLY LAW: THE
FIRST FIvE YEARS (Adrian Emch & David Stallibrass, eds., 2013); H. STEPHEN HARRIS, JR., PETER J. WANG,
YIZHE ZHANG, MARK A. COHEN & SEBASTIENJ. EvRAD, ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA
(2011); see also Thomas R. Howell, Alan Wolff, Rachel Howe & Diane Oh, China's New Anti-Monopoly Law: A
Perspective from the United States, 18 PAC. Rim L. & POL'YJ. 53, 55-63 (2009); Zue Kepeng & Charlotte Z.
Westfall, Chinese Monopoly Law: A Practical Guide, 18 No. 1 COMPETITIONJ. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION 1 (2009).
2. See Zh6nghui r6nmin g6nghtgu6 fan 16ngduin fa (t@ AIUiW I)fg) (Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ 68, ch. II, art. 13-16 (China).
3. See id. ch. I, art. 17-19.
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"Concentrations of Undertakings,"4 and "Prohibitions of Abuse of Administrative Powers
to Restrict Competition."5 Although China's AML is in its infancy, and numerous ques-
tions remain to be answered, China has gained valuable experience in interpreting and
enforcing its AML since 2008.6
Competition laws and their enforcement provide a probing lens into the fundamental
values and norms that undergird a modem society's economic and political systems.7 As a
result, China's new AML and its first five years of enforcement offer unique potential
insights into China's traditional values and culture, and their possible impact on China's
developing economy and regulatory system.
This article discusses the historical, cultural, and philosophical values that have helped
mold modem China and its powerful and thriving economy and examines how they have
helped to shape and influence China's current AML. Rather than following the United
States and Europe, China appears to be charting its own course in interpreting and en-
forcing its competition laws. Based upon China's history, culture, and Confucian ethics
and morals, this article forecasts that China's future AML enforcement will be based upon
social, moral, and ethical considerations, as well as economic ones.8 This article concludes
that in the coming years, China should continue to follow an evolutionary, rather than a
strict, neoclassical economic approach, in dealing with future behavioral and structural
competition issues.9
4. See id. ch. IV, art. 20-31.
5. See id. ch. V, art. 32-37.
6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Jenny Xiaojin Huang, Analyzing Information &vchanges between Competi-
tors under the Anti-Monopoly Law, in CHwA's ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, supra note 1,
at 95, 97 ("Although a lot of questions remain to be answered, China's enforcement of the AML has not
stagnated.").
7. See, e.g., Mitsuo Matsushita, Matsushita on China's Anti-Monopoly Law: The First Five Years, ANTITRUST
& COMPETITION POL'Y BLOG (Aug. 12, 2013), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.comi/antitrustprof
blog/2013/08/matsushita-on-.html (arguing that "competition policy and law is part of the society in which it
operates and necessarily reflects the features of society and politico-economic system of the country"); Ru-
DOLPH J.R. PERIZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIc, LAw 3 (Rev'd ed. 2000)
("Competition policy has been one of twentieth-century America's most durable goods. Whether in business,
politics, sports, or speech, a vision of robust rivalry-of free competition-has inspired our social theories,
directed our practices, and informed our public discourse."); Thomas J. Horton, Competition or Monopoly? The
Implications of Complexity Science, Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and Competition Policy, 51
ANITRusT BULL. 195, 201 (2006) ("The history of the continuing debates as to antitrust legislation and
regulation reveals that how people think about antitrust issues is generally tied to their underlying assump-
tions and premises, as well as their implied values."); John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept ofa Compet-
itive Process, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 893, 897 (1990) (arguing that good competition policy must take into
account the "social and political values of a just community, the integrity of individualism in that community,
and the ideal of equality of economic opportunity.").
8. This article does not seek to review or duplicate the excellent and extensive scholarship addressing the
first five years of China's AML enforcement activities and initiatives. See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 1;
CHINA'S AN-n-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIvE YEARs, supra note 1. Nor should this article be read as a
defense of China's one-party Communist government or an attempt to mitigate the serious problems of
economic corruption, environmental pollution, or individual and human rights that China must address in
the coming decades. A full and fair treatment of such issues is beyond the scope of this article.
9. For detailed discussions of this author's recommended evolutionary approaches to antitrust, see Thomas
J. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 44 McGEORGE L. REv. -823 (2013)
[hereinafter Horton, Fairness and Antitrust]; Thomas J. Horton, Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust
Double Helix: Applying Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust fury Trials, 41 U. BALT. L.
REV. 615 (2012) [hereinafter Horton, Antitrust Double Helix]; and Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Frtinction of
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Part II of this article addresses why China's future AML interpretation and enforce-
ment likely will be guided by social, moral, and ethical considerations, as well as purely
economic ones. Section H.A. reviews the diverse and complex economic, political, and
social issues facing China today. Section II.A. 1. examines the importance to China of its
traditional cultural and historical values. As is discussed below, many Chinese fear a west-
ernization of China could undermine its national spirit and transform China into a west-
ern appendage. Section II.A.2. then lays out a sampling of the current harsh western
criticisms and pressures China faces as it seeks to build and develop its legal system and
competition regulation program.
Section II.B. studies China's long history of Confucianism and its effect on Chinese law
and government. Section II.B.1. discusses Confucianism, while Section II.B.2. examines
the impact of virtue, morality, and the rule of law on Chinese culture. As is demonstrated,
Chinese core Confucian values, such as fairness and justice in economic competition,
while considered soft and mushy by some western critics, are non-negotiable bedrocks to
the Chinese and their leaders. Section II.C., therefore, posits that China is likely to be
guided by its unique Confucian history and culture in interpreting and enforcing its AML.
Part III discusses how China has chosen to protect its traditional Confucian morals and
values by following an evolutionary approach, instead of a neoclassical economic one, in
its AML. The emerging evolutionary approach to antitrust is guided by the exploding
fields of evolutionary economics and biology.10 From a behavioral antitrust perspective,
evolutionary theory counsels that morality, ethics, fairness, and reciprocity are crucial to
building and sustaining thriving competitive economies." On the structural side, evolu-
tionary theory advises that diversity, variation, and multiplicity are critical to maintaining
stable and efficient competitive economic systems.12
Section M.A. argues that China's AML is based upon an emerging evolutionary ap-
proach, rather than a neoclassical economic approach, to behavioral competition issues.
China's emerging evolutionary approach to behavioral competition issues is a natural out-
growth of its determination to build a thriving competitive economy while protecting and
Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School ofAntiterust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and
Behavioral Antitrust Analysis, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 469 (2011) [hereinafter Horton, Coming Ertinction].
10. See, e.g., Eiuc D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE
RADICAL REMAKING OF EcoNomics 11 (2006) ("The same process that has driven the growing order and
complexity of the biosphere has driven the growing order and complexity of the 'econosphere.'"); id. at 16
("The notion that the economy is an evolutionary system is a radical idea, especially because it directly con-
tradicts much of the standard theory in economics developed over the past one hundred years. It is far from a
new idea, however. Evolutionary theory and economics have a long and intertwined history."); Paul J. Zak,
Values and Value: Moral Economics, in MoRAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES IN THE EcoNoMY
259, 276 (P.J. Zak ed., 2008) (discussing the emerging field of evolutionary economics); James Eggert, Op-
Ed, A Silence of Meadowlarks: Can a Songbird's Demise Lead Us to a Better Economics? WASH. PosT, Aug. 4,
1991, at C3 (arguing that the time is ripe "to incorporate ecological thinking and ecological values with
market thinking and values"). It is important to recognize that modern evolutionary theory does not in any
way incorporate the outmoded theories of social Darwinism and its biased arguments that "there is a struggle
and competition, and the weakest go to the wall." See Michael Ruse, The History of Evolutionary Thought,
EVOLUTION: THE FIRST FOUR BILLION YEARS 1, 29 (Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis, eds., 2009); and Hor-
ton, Coming Ertinction, supra note 9, at 479-82.
11. See, e.g., Horton, Coming Ertinction, supra note 9, at 522 (discussing the importance of the evolution of
human morality, ethics, fairness, and reciprocity to our thriving free-enterprise system).
12. See, e.g., id. at 521 (discussing the importance of diversity, variation, and multiplicity in economic
systems).
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leveraging its traditional Confucian morals and values. Such an approach implies that
China is likely to pursue norms of competitive fairness and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) going forward.
Section I.B. contends that China is seeking to pursue the evolutionary objectives of
promoting diversity, variety, and multiplicity in its approach to structural competition
issues. Such an approach is designed to catalyze and promote the entrepreneurial spirit of
its citizens and guard the economic contributions of its vast array of small and medium-
sized business enterprises.
China and its leaders surely must confront a daunting array of complex questions and
issues in seeking to sustain and leverage China's surging international and domestic eco-
nomic prowess. As examples, do ongoing issues of economic corruption in China show
that China's proclamation of the need to maintain its historic and traditional Confucian
ethics and morals is little more than hollow rhetoric? Are China's state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and its desire to protect certain national industries inconsistent with China's as-
serted support for small and medium-sized business enterprises? No easy answers or solu-
tions await China.
China today faces no shortage of international and domestic criticism concerning its
economic and political systems. In the competition arena, for example, critics are urging
China to adopt and pursue a western neoclassical economic approach to structural and
behavioral competition issues. Facing such questions and criticisms, it may be tempting
for China and its AML enforcers to abandon China's Confucianist traditions and morals
and China's evolutionary approach to competition issues. China and its competition reg-
ulators should resist such temptations and pressures and continue following an evolution-
ary approach in interpreting and enforcing China's AML.
H. China's AML Enforcement Likely Will be Guided by Social, Moral, and
Ethical Considerations
American, European, and Japanese antitrust and competition regulators, lawyers, and
economists have taken understandable pride in counseling and helping China in drafting,
adopting, and interpreting its new AIL.13 Indeed, "[t]he core provisions of the AML
were modeled on EU competition law, and to a lesser extent, on the laws of the United
States, Germany, Japan, and other countries."14
Nevertheless, in seeking to understand China's AML and to make meaningful scholarly
predictions about its interpretation and enforcement, it is critical to realize that China is
13. Noted Chinese competition scholar Professor Xiaoye Wang regards China's AML "as a great achieve-
ment of international cooperation." Xiaoye Wang, Highlights of China's New Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 A-n-
TRUST L.J. 133, 134 (2008). Professor Wang observes that "{t]he competition enforcement agencies of other
countries, in particular the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, and the Euro-
pean Commission contributed significant assistance." Id.
14. HiUUs ET AL., supra note 1, at 2-3. The authors further note that "[mlany of the stated goals of the
AML are broadly consistent with those of such other jurisdictions' laws, including preventing or stopping
monopolistic conduct, safeguarding and promoting the order of fair market competition, improving eco-
nomic efficiency, and protecting the interests of consumers." Id. See also Wang, supra note 13, at 134 ("[I]t is
no surprise that many good provisions from other well-established antitrust laws have been incorporated in
the Chinese AML.").
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attempting to create and sustain unique legal' 5 and economic16 systems. As a result, it is
"necessary and crucial not only to carefully examine the words of the AML, but to read
them in the context and light of Chinese history, culture, and traditions." 7 As recognized
by former American Antitrust Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate,
Whether we like it or not, Chinese antitrust is going to be different from the U.S.
and European varieties. Close attention to the underlying conditions and attitudes
that will drive Chinese antitrust enforcement will yield more insight than comparing
the AML with that of the U.S. and European statutes and court decisions.' 8
Unfortunately, most western antitrust and competition lawyers and economists have
little real knowledge of China's rich history and culture. Even such noted Chinese history
scholars as John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman have humbly recognized that "[w]e
still have much to learn about modern China from her history."' 9
Anyone attempting to understand China's AML and predict its future enforcement
must first recognize that the PRC is not a western-style democracy. Some scholars have
argued that China may be "the only civilization the world has known upon which Western
thought exercised little or no influence at all until modern times." 20 China's historical
culture was largely "independent of Western influences" and its responses to its peoples'
economic needs are often peculiar to China and sharply differentiated from other
countries. 21
15. See, e.g., Benjamin Liebman, Assessing China's Legal Reforms, 23 COLUA. J. ASIAN L. 17, 31 (2009); see
also HARRIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 3 ("[D]espite strong influences from EU, U.S., and other competition
laws, and though it is likely that China will continue to draw upon the experiences of other jurisdictions in
interpreting and applying the AML, it must be borne in mind that China's law is a unique piece of legislation
directed to China's unique economic and political circumstances, and not borrowed wholesale from the Euro-
pean Union, United States, or any other system.").
16. See, e.g., Matsushita, supra note 7, at 1 ("The Chinese economy is a unique hybrid of market and non-
market principles and may present a new model for economic systems to developing countries of the world.").
17. Horton & Huang, snpra note 1, at 98; see also HARRIS Er AL., supra note 1, at 5 ("Those companies
doing business in China must now take measures to ensure those compliance policies address the unique
aspects of the AML."); HOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 54 (In the absence of a global set of competition
rules, prescribed by the WTO (World Trade Organization) or otherwise, China "could not, even if it had so
chosen, conform its policy regime to a single unitary system of multilateral norms. For China, divergence
from at least some national competition regimes has been inescapable.").
18. R. Hewitt Pate, What I Heard in the Great Hall of the People-Realistic Expectations of Chinese Antitrust, 75
ANTfflRUST L. J. 195, 211 (2008); see also Matsushita, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that "the features of the
AML introduced from Europe will be blended with traditions and values in China as time passes, and ulti-
mately it will provide a model for East Asian or Asian competition laws"); Wentong Zheng, Transplanting
Antitrust in China: Economic Transition, Market Structure, and State Control, 32 U. PA. J. lN-T'L L. 643, 720
(2010). ("This article demonstrates that the transplant in China of a formal antitrust law in the mold of
Western antitrust laws takes place under local conditions that are not entirely compatible with Western anti-
trust models. These local conditions, chiefly the traditional stage China is in, China's market structures, and
pervasive state control in China's economy have limited the reach and applicability of the AML.. . . In sum,
despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not developed and likely will not develop Western-
style antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to these local conditions.").
19. JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHiNA: A Nrw HISTORY 381 (2006).
20. NoRmAuN KoTKER & CHARLES PATRICK FITZGERALD, THE HORIZON HISTORY OF CHINA 10 (Nor-
man Kotker, ed., 1969).
21. Id. at 11.
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While China's AML shares many aspects of American and European competition law
principles, it ultimately serves China's unique socialist political-legal system. 22 Article 1 of
China's AML boldly proclaims that one of its major purposes is "protecting the consumer
and public interests, and promoting the healthy development of the socialist market econ-
omy."23 Article 4 adds that "[t]he State shall formulate and implement competition rules
compatible with the socialist market economy, perfect macroeconomic supervision and
control, and develop a united, open, competitive, and orderly market system." 24 Some
may argue that such bold pronouncements and objectives are inconsistent with the reali-
ties of life today in China and the feelings of China's citizenry, many of whom seem to
welcome unbridled western capitalism. Nevertheless, such pronouncements reveal that
future competition policy decisions in China "are likely to be influenced as much or more
by China's unique culture and history, as by the influences of competition laws and deci-
sions in the EU, the United States, and other jurisdictions."25
This section addresses the various cultural, historical, and social considerations that are
likely to impact and influence China's future AML enforcement. Section II.A. 1. first dis-
cusses China's strong interest in protecting its unique cultural and social values. Section
II.A.2. next reviews the key political and economic western and global criticisms of
China's AML enforcement activities to date. Section II.B. then analyzes the historical and
cultural impact of Confucianism on China's laws and regulations. The relationship of
virtue and law in Chinese culture is examined, as well as Chinese conceptions of public
and personal morality. Section IH.C. discusses why it is likely that China will be guided
heavily by its own long history and Confucian traditions in pursuing its future AML en-
forcement path.
A. EcoNoMic, POLITICAL, AND SoCIAL IssuEs FACING CHINA TODAY
Scholars have struggled to fully understand and define China's current diverse and com-
plex political, economic, and legal systems. 26 "[T]he shape of the market economy that
China wishes to adopt has remained unresolved," and the Chinese themselves "are strug-
gling with issues, including the appropriate norms of competition, that have long been the
subject of controversy within and between capitalist systems." 27 This is not surprising, as
22. See Horton & Huang, supra note 1, at 98; Ignazio Castelluci, Rule ofLaw with Chinese Characteristics, 13
A''NN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 35, 83-84 (2007).
23. See Zh6nghui r6nmfn g6ngh6gu6 fan 16ngduan fi (IPARA fimE t) [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING CoMm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ 68, ch. II, art. 13-16 (China).
24. Id. art. 4.
25. Horton & Huang, supra note 1, at 98.
26. See, e.g., FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 464-69. The authors observe that while China's
"market economy and openness to the outside world [have] loosened the all-encompassing controls of the
Mao years, allowing far more intellectual diversity and personal freedom," China is "still an authoritarian
state" and its "communist party-state remains in power." Id. at 465. They add, "[tlhe continuing move to the
market and the open-door policies that have led to China's weakening party-state might in time bring about a
freer, more democratic society as China's population becomes more prosperous and begins to demand greater
rights.... Yet the development of appropriate political institutions, such as local elections and the efforts to
establish the rule of law, is only at an embryonic stage in China, and could easily be arrested." Id. at 469.
27. Scott Kennedy, The Price of Competition: Pricing Policies and the Struggle to Define China's Economic Sys-
tem, 49 THE CHINAJ. 1 (2003).
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China is attempting to achieve full economic modernization without the representative
democratic governments and institutions found in most western capitalist countries.28
Moreover, China is attempting to embrace and exploit the economic gains of western-
style capitalism while preserving "certain immutable values." 29
1. Preserving and Protecting China's Traditional Cultural and Historical Values
Protecting and preserving its immutable cultural, historical, and social values is para-
mount in China's mind. "Countries all over the world differ greatly in terms of economic
development, legal systems, cultural standards, and individual's perception of ethics." 30
China is no exception. The Chinese are rightfully proud of their unique cultural history
and values, which they believe to be a superior glue that has helped hold together their
great civilization for thousands of years. 3' Some Chinese critics have gone so far as to
accuse their countrymen of "extreme arrogance" in lauding their Chinese values. 32
The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) leaders recognize that China's recent eco-
nomic reforms and staggering successes have unleashed potential social, cultural, and eco-
nomic tensions that could threaten China's societal harmony.33 "A pervasive sense of
insecurity about the future" and a fear of chaos have "haunted the Chinese people since
time immemorial."3 4 Many in China have long been "appalled by the social evils of unbri-
dled capitalism and extreme individualism in the West."35
Underlying such fears and tensions is a long history of destructive imperialism in China,
which has led to "social disruption and psychological demoralization" and, at times,
28. See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 1.
29. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA xx (1990).
30. Lin Ge & Stuart Thomas, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Deliberative Reasoning of Canadian and
Chinese Accounting Students, 82 J. Bus. ETHICS 189, 190 (2008). The authors further observe that "[d]ifferent
cultural backgrounds lead to various ways of perceiving the world, and therefore, individuals in different
cultures may come to different conclusions when resolving ethical dilemmas." Id. The famous anthropolo-
gist Franz Boas and his followers (including Melville J. Herskovitz and Margaret Mead), believed that "moral
values are relative to each culture, and that there is no way of showing that the values of one culture are better
than those of another." Marian Eabrasu, A Moral Pluralist Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility: From
Good to Controversial Practices, 110 J. Bus. ETHICS 429 (2012).
31. See, e.g., FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, Supra note 19, at 25 ("Because the Asian invaders became more
powerful as warriors, the Chinese found their refuge in social institutions and feelings of cultural and aes-
thetic superiority-something that alien conquest could not take away."); id. at 14 (China "is held together by a
way of life and a system of government much more deeply rooted than our own, and stretching further back
uninterruptedly into the past.").
32. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 29, at 720 (quoting Bo YANG, SEEDS OF FIRE: CHINESE VOICES OF
CONSCIENCE 174 (Geremie Barm6 & John Minford, eds., 1989)).
33. See, e.g., Geoffrey Kok Heng See, Harmonious Society and Chinese CSR: Is There Really a Link? 89 J. Bus.
ETHICS 1, 2 (2009) (arguing that addressing China's social and economic issues "is a top national priority
because these problems have resulted in social instability that threatens the CCP's grip on power. The CCP
recognizes that it could lose political legitimacy if it fails to respond to these problems effectively.").
34. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 439.
35. Edmund S. K. Fung, State Building, Capitalist Development, and Social Justice: Social Democracy in China's
Modern Transformation, 1921-1949, 31 MODERN CHINA 318, 320 (2005); see also id. at 444 (discussing Chinese
beliefs that "a revived Confucianism could provide the intellectual and cultural underpinnings for China's
rapid economic development while helping China avoid the immorality and individualism of western
capitalism").
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threatened China's "entire way of life."36 Understandably, many Chinese fear a "West-
ernization" of China that could undermine China's national spirit and transform China
into a western appendage.37 Indeed, in late nineteenth-century China, a self-strengthen-
ing movement arose with the dual objectives of learning from and adopting western tech-
nologies and economic theories, while maintaining China's traditional cultural and social
values.38
Behind China's fears of "Westernization" lies the stark reality that there are substantial
cultural disconnects between the United States (and many other western nations) and
China that cannot be ignored or easily subsumed. For example, cross-cultural compari-
sons between traditional western cultures and the PRC have received substantial attention
in recent years.39 Such studies have revealed dramatic differences in the cultural values of
individualism and collectivism in the United States and China. 40 "These differences re-
flect the common assertion that advanced Western societies are very individualistic, while
Asian cultures have a more collective orientation."41 Historians John King Fairbank and
Merle Goldman observe that "[1]iving so closely with family members and neighbors has
accustomed the Chinese people to a collective life in which the group normally dominates
the individual."4 2 In the words of the now-deceased China scholar Professor Lucian W.
Pye, "[a]t the core of Chinese ethics and morality there has always been the ideal of de-
pressing self-interest and glorifying self-sacrifice for the collectivity."4 3
Many Chinese believe that their culture more strongly embraces humanism as an ideal
than western cultures. The Chinese "have always had a very strong humanist outlook."4 4
36. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 189 ("Today's historians are more likely to stress the social
disruption and psychological demoralization caused by foreign imperialism. In these dimensions the long-
term foreign invasion[s] of China proved to be a disaster so comprehensive and appalling that we are still
incapable of fully describing it."); see also MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT: Gooo AND EVIL IN WWII
14-21 (2011) (describing Japan's horrific invasion of China in World War II and racism towards the Chinese);
IRIS CIiANG, THE RAPE OF NA.NING: THE FORGoTTrEN HOLOCAusT OF WORLD WAR 11 (1997) (describ-
ing the horrors ofJapan's invasion of Nanking during World War II).
37. See SPENCE, supra note 29, at 643 (quoting Shannon Brown, China's Program ofTechnologyAcquisition, in
CHINA'S FOUR MODERNIZATIONs 159-163 (Richard Baum ed., 1980)).
38. FAIRBANK & GOLDMVIAN, supra note 19, at 408.
39. See, e.g., William E. Shafer, Kyoko Fukukawa & Grace Meina Lee, Values and the Perceived Importance of
Ethics and Social Responsihility: The U.S. Versus China, 70 J. Bus. EI -ucs 265 (2007); Vivienne Brand & Amy
Slater, Using a Qualitative Approach to Gain Insights into the Business Ethics Experiences ofAustralian Managers in
China, 45 J. Bus. ErHics 167 (2003).
40. See, e.g., Shafer et al., supra note 39, at 267.
41. Id. at 267. The authors add that "the collectivistic orientation of Chinese societies is often attributed to
the influence of Confucianism, with its emphasis on respect for brotherhood, social harmony, and the protec-
tion of the interests of one's in-group... . The second striking difference is also a reflection of influence of
traditional Confucian values-the Confucian dynamism dimension. Hong Kong and Taiwan ranked 2, and 3,
respectively on long-term orientation. The U.S., in contrast, ranked 27." Id.
42. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 17. Professors Fairbank and Goldman add that "one gener-
alization in the lore about China is the absorption of the individual not only in the world of nature but also in
the social collectivity." Id. See also id. at 258 ("Individualism and liberalism in Chinese thinking were strictly
limited parts of a larger collectivity. The Chinese individual was subordinate to the group.").
43. Lucian W. Pye, The State and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation, 127 THE CHINA Q. 443, 444
(1991) [hereinafter Pye, The State and the Individual). Pye further notes that "{tlhe Chinese instinct has in-
deed been to see individualism as nothing more than self-centeredness." Id. at 447.
44. FriZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 116. The authors further observe that "[t]he Chinese are
not a religious people. The bent of their minds has always been humanist." Id. at 127. American history, by
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Conversely, some Chinese scholars have argued that the Western "culture of individual-
ism is morally vacuous and socially irresponsible." 45
The Chinese concept of law also is "fundamentally different from legal conceptions in
the West."46 Unlike western laws, Chinese law draws heavily upon the legal philosophies
of Confucianism.47 In addition, the "regulatory culture in China tends to emphasize a
dynamic by which governance is pursued by a sovereign political authority that remains
largely immune to challenge."48 Furthermore, "[tlhe Chinese have a less clear and inflexi-
ble demarcation between right and wrong. There are no obviously wrong areas of life....
Moderation is the key, not prohibition." 49 In short, "the Chinese notion of the role of law
differs from its western counterpart[s], based on two main factors: China's socialist experi-
ence and its unique history."so
It is important for westerners to understand that China is intensely proud and protec-
tive of its unique cultural, social, and legal values and traditions. In pursuing its socialist
market economy and "popular democracy," China does not want to be "the tail of some-
one else's dog."51 It has "never been easy" for foreigners to fully understand or work with
contrast, shows a deep religiosity and compunction for protecting the free exercise of religion. See, e.g.,
PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNFSS 142 (1956); MERLE CURTI, THE GROHTrH OF AMERICAN
THOUGHT 3 (3d ed. 1964) ("The Christian tradition, introduced by the first comers, reinforced by nearly all
their European successors, and perpetuated by conscious effort, was the chief foundation stone of American
intellectual development. No intellectual interest served so effectively as Christian thought to bring some
degree of unity to the different classes, regions, and ethnic groups."); ANDREw DELBANCO, THE PURITAN
ORDEAL 91 (1991) (describing the belief that "God had appointed America as the place where he would ...
establish the throne of David's kingdom") (quotingJohn Cotton, God's Promise to His Plantation 7 (1630); THE
SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE (Robert S. Alley, ed., 1988)).
45. Pye, The State and the Individual, supra note 43, at 447 (quoting Zhao Fusan, Some Thoughts on Certain
Aspects ofModern Western Culture: Reading Notes, PEOPLE's DAILY) (as quoted by Richard Madsen, The Spiri-
tual Crisis of China's Intellectuals, in CHINESE SOCIETY ON THE EvE OF TIANANMEN: THE IMPACT OF RE-
FORM 247 (D. Davis & E. Vogel, eds., 1990)).
46. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 183. The authors explain that in China, the laws "came from
the moral character of the natural universe itself, from this world, not from another world beyond human
ken. .. . So the breaking of such rules was a matter of practical expedience rather than of religious principle.
Laws were subordinate to morality. Their sanction lay in reason or the common social experience that un-
derlay morals. This system avoided the unhappy dualism that grew up in the West between the letter of the
law and the dictates of commonsense morality." Id.
47. See, e.g., Jun Shzo & Ming Hu, A Comparative Study of the Legal Education System in the United States and
China and the Reform of Legal Education in China, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. Rov. 329, 331 (2012).
48. Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms
and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 119, 124 - 25 (2003); see also Castellucci, supra note 22, at
64 (observing that "[a] 'socialist' rule of law still implies the guiding role of a single, or preeminent, party over
the political and legal system, as well as the prevalence of common interest over individual ones, and other
fundamental [Chinese] values.").
49. Jatinder J. Singh, Scott J. Vitell, Jamal Al-Khatib & Irvine Clark m, The Role of Moral Intensity and
Personal Moral Philosophies in the Ethical Decision Making ofMarketers: A Cross-Cultural Comparison ofChina and
the United States, 15 J. INT'L. MARKETING 86, 105 (2007).
50. Castellucci, supra note 22, at 36. Professor Castellucci further concludes that "China's popular democ-
racy and Western liberal democracies [are] two different things." Id. at 64.
51. See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 322 ("The final factor making for sinification was the
overriding sentiment of Chinese nationalism based on cultural and historical pride, which meant that China
could not be the tail of someone else's dog. In effect, the Chinese people could accept only a Chinese.
Marxism.").
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the Chinese Revolution. 52 But there can be little doubt that China will work vigorously to
protect its unique historical and cultural values despite often-strident criticism from the
West.
2. Western Criticisms and Pressures on China
As China moves forward with its AML regulation, it faces no shortage of criticism from
western antitrust practitioners and scholars, as well as its own growing body of competi-
tion scholars and practitioners. Generally, these criticisms can be lumped into three broad
categories: (1) China's government and regulations tend to suppress individual rights and
initiatives; (2) China's economy needs to be less state-driven; and (3) China's AML and its
enforcers are driven less by a concern for protecting competition than by promoting vari-
ous social policies and issues. These criticisms are discussed below.
a. China's Suppression of Individual Rights and Initiatives
Modern China and the CCP have been extensively criticized from within and without
for suppressing and even destroying individual rights and initiatives. Such criticisms be-
gan shortly after Mao Zedong and the CCP's ascension to power. For example, Chinese
intellectual writer Ding Ling wrote stories about how the CCP was "enforcing an ideo-
logical outlook that destroyed individual initiative and opinion."5 3 Western critics fol-
lowed Ding Ling by branding the Chinese as "robotlike followers."54
Even more graphically, Professor Lucian W. Pye strongly questioned China's seeming
belief that "economic growth can occur without the individualism associated with pluralis-
tic democracy."55 Professor Pye disputed the alleged superiority of Asian and Chinese
"values [that] differ from Western ones in their emphasis on the community rather than
the individual."5 6 From Professor Pye's perspective, a "huge gap" exists in China between
the community of citizens and the level of the state.5 7 Professor Pye argued, "[t]he world
of the citizen and that of the government remain far apart in a non-democratic Asia. To
define the state as the only legitimate community, and thus deprive citizens of individual
rights, comes close to advancing a fascist ideology."s8
Professor Pye concluded by questioning China's ability to "build a new 'spiritual civili-
zation' and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics"' without increasing individual rights
and freedoms, and accepting "the need for society as a whole to take a lead in this quest."59
b. China's State-Driven Economy
A corollary criticism to the lack of individual rights in China is that China's economy is
too state-driven and controlled. As an example, Chinese-law expert Donald C. Clarke
wrote in 2007 "that China's path so far has been almost exclusively that of the model of
52. See id. at 327 ("For foreigners to work with the Chinese Revolution has never been easy.").
53. SPENCE, supra note 29, at 473.
54. Id. at 532.
55. Lucian W. Pye, Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society: Three Powerful Concepts for Erplaining Asia, 29 J.
INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY 763 (1999) [hereinafter Pye, Civility].
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state-driven development, and that more balance is desirable." 60 Professor Clarke ques-
dons whether China will really succeed in creating a true market economy by stating,
Taken together, these developments hint that it is too early to assume that the path to
further reform is clear and largely uncontested. Opposition to further reforms in the
direction of markets and increased openings for the private sector may be more deep-
rooted than hitherto supposed, and this opposition might be able to link up with the
strain of economic nationalism demonstrated in the controversy over acquisitions of
Chinese firms.'6
Following Professor Clarke, other critics have raised questions concerning the indepen-
dence of China's new regulatory structure. For example, Professor Margaret M. Pearson
argues that, "while impressive changes during the past decade have given the agencies that
regulate China's strategic industries the initial appearance of independent regulators, the
actual finction of an independent regulatory structure is far from established." 62 Professor
Pearson adds that "the state has positioned itself as a crucial player at the commanding
heights of China's economy; in that realm, regulatory reform has sustained, rather than
attenuated, government control."63
Criticisms of China's repressive economic oversight recently crescendoed with Google's
drastic decision to withdraw from mainland China.64 Google's decision was catalyzed by
Chinese government censorship. 65 Professors Justin and Ann E. Tan noted that "[b]oth
Yahoo! and Microsoft faced similar scenarios in China when forced to choose between
complying with the repressive censorship policies or defying the laws of the host coun-
try. "66 Professors Tan and Tan conclude from Google's travails that the "need to comply
with and capitulate to state demands" in China "seems heightened, especially considering
its increasing importance as an international market, but continued status as a repressive,
authoritarian system of social control."67
3. Criticisms of China's AML and its Enforcement
Numerous scholars and practitioners have criticized China's AML and its first five years
of enforcement. A leading criticism is that instead of focusing on simply increasing com-
petition, China's AML attempts to achieve too many social objectives that could be better
60. Donald C. Clarke, Legislating for a Market Economy in China, 191 THE CHINA Q. 567, 568 (2007).
61. Id. at 577.
62. Margaret M. Pearson, The Business of Governing Business in China: Institutions and Norms of the Emerging
Regulatory State, 57 WORLD POL. 296, 297 (2005). In fairness, Professor Pearson points out that "[lt]here is
substantial evidence that Chinese reformers are striving to move toward the independent regulator model."
Id. at 301.
63. Id. at 321. Professor Pearson predicts a continued "reformulated role for strong state oversight at the
highest levels." Id. at 322.
64. Justin Tan & Anna E. Tan, Business Under Threat, Technology Under Attack, Ethics Under Fire: The Experi-




67. Id. Professors Tan and Tan go on to brand China as a "repressive regime that simultaneously fosters
and hinders [rapid economic development]." Id.
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handled outside the AML's domain. 68 Even before the AML was passed in 2008, western
critics-like Professor Clarke and the American Bar Association (ABA)-worried that
China's AML was hoping to achieve such social objectives as fair prices. 69 Following this
line, on May 3, 2013, Reuters reported criticisms that in enforcing its AML, China was
"appearing to use industrial policy protection rather than consumer protection as a
benchmark." 70
A strong undercurrent of many of the western criticisms of China's AML and its en-
forcement is that China is not following the conservative economic agenda that has domi-
nated American antitrust since the 1980s. 71 As an example, Professor Wentong Zheng
criticizes China for favoring "duplication of industries at the provincial level," as well as
for its "generally low market concentration ratios" and "low economies of scale." 72 On
April 23, 2013, a Harvard Business Law Review article echoed Professor Zheng's concerns
by blasting China for having too much production "from small companies that possessed
no scale economies." 73 Professor Zheng concluded that "in all three major areas of anti-
trust-cartels, abuse of dominant market position, and merger review-China's local con-
ditions have prevented the AML from becoming an integral part of China's competition
policy."74
China's objectives of promoting economic stability and fairness also have come under
strong attack. Professor Benjamin van Rooij, for example, believes that China's economic
regulation is too focused on stability.75 Others question what they call "an infatuation,
common in Asia, with 'fairness."76 Professor Liu believes that the "[f]ack of a strong
68. See Clarke, supra note 60, at 581.
69. See id.
70. Michael Martina, Insight: Flexing Antitrust Muscle, China Is a New Merger Hurdle, REUTERS (May 2,
2013. 5:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-mergers-regulation-china-insight-idUSBRE
94116920130502. The article adds that China's merger enforcement agency (MOFCOM) is forced to heed
powerful demands from above that are "less concerned with promoting competition and consumer welfare
than with carving out space for domestic champions." Id.
71. See, e.g., Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 825 - 26 ("Economics rules antitrust today.
Jurists and scholars favoring economic 'consumer welfare' considerations and disfavoring fairness considera-
tions in antitrust analyses are ascendant. Allocative efficiency is positively equated with consumer welfare.");
Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 563-66 (2012) (discussing the ascen-
dance of Chicago School's neoclassical theories in antitrust jurisprudence since the late 1970s); Jesse W.
Markham, Jr., Lessons for Competition Law From the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the
'Too-Big-to-Fail'Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 278-81 (2011) ("The current state of
antitrust law is often referred to as embracing 'Post-Chicago School' economic theory. Post-Chicago School
antitrust is the stepchild of Chicago School antitrust . . . post-Chicago antitrust theory departs from the
Chicago School views mostly around the margins.").
72. Zheng, supra note 18, at 659; see also id. at 658 ("The duplication of industries at the local level also led
to loss of economies of scale . . . examples of low economies of scale abound in China's economy.").
73. Ushua C.V. Haley & George T. Haley, How Chinese Subsidies Changed the World, HARv. Bus. REv.
(Apr. 25, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/04/how-chinese-subsidies-changed/.
74. Zheng, supra note 18, at 671. Professor Zheng also criticizes the "staggering levels" of excess capacity in
many of China's industries. Id. at 675.
75. Benjamin Van Rooij, The People's Regulation: Citizens and Implementation ofLaw in China, 25 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 116, 116 (2012) ("China's halfhearted approach to regulatory governance with its focus on stability
may ultimately be destabilizing.").
76. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Liu, All About Fair Trade?-Competition Law in Taiwan and East Asian Economic
Development, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 259 (2012). Professor Liu warns China of the difficult road ahead "if
the mandate in the competition law includes fairness-based goals." Id. at 261.
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political commitment to robust competition laws, while clinging to fuzzy notions of fair-
ness, can reduce the predictability of [Chinese] law enforcement."'7 7
Western antitrust practitioners have joined scholars in attacking China's refusal to fol-
low Western neoclassical economic thinking. As an example, in 2009, four American anti-
trust practitioners urged that "China's AML frequently reflects principles similar to those
once embedded in U.S. antitrust policy, but which have been abandoned or modified by
U.S. policymakers and courts in a sustained process of policymaking through trial and
error."78 The authors criticize China's AML abuse of dominance provisions as "bear[ing]
a closer resemblance to U.S. antitrust policies of the 1940s through the 1960s than to the
current policy."7 9
Much of the western criticism of China's AML and its ongoing enforcement reveals a
fundamental lack of understanding of China's history and culture. For example, many
American commentators urge that "Chinese law suffers from excessive generality and
vagueness."s0 Yet, "[t]he Chinese language, itself an extension of the tenets and qualities
of Confucianism, is heavily dependent on context."81 Similarly, the Chinese idea of a
moral community, which has its basis in Confucianism, is "often difficult for outsiders to
grasp." 82
B. CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE LAw
An attempt to fully describe Chinese Confucianism is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, enough generalizations can be safely drawn to begin appreciating the poten-
tial long-term impacts of Confucianism and Chinese culture on China's AML and its
future enforcement.
1. Chinese Conficianism
Modem China abounds with shrines to Confucius, the founding father of China's ethi-
cal system.83 Confucius lived in China between 551 and 479 B.C.84 Confucius's writings
77. Id. at 301. Professor Liu continues, "The tendency in large Asian economies to pursue fairness in
designing or implementing a competition law regime could have profound-and not necessarily benign-
ramifications across the region, around the world, and indeed for their own long-term development." Id.
78. Howell et al., supra note 1, at 53. The authors add that "[the areas of divergence from U.S. antitrust
practice recall an earlier era in the United States, when antitrust was an expression of popular anxieties,
political and social values, and a system of economic regulation." Id. at 95. They further urge China to avoid
"what appear[s] to have been some wrong turns by U.S. antitrust policy in the past . . . ." Id.
79. Id. at 68. The authors proudly proclaim that "[iln general, U.S. antitrust policy has evolved from a
system of regulation based on political, social, and ideological considerations to one premised on modern
economic principles." Id. at 54. Nor discussed is whether Chicago School economic principles themselves
might be little more than political, social, and ideological considerations dressed up in pseudo-scientific garb.
See, e.g., Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, rupra note 9, at 670 ("The Chicago/Harvard antitrust double helix
has provided the philosophical basis for the diminished enforcement of our antitrust law for more than thirty
years.").
80. Micaela Tucker, "Guanxi!" -"Gesundheit!" An Alternative View ofthe "Rule ofLaw" Panacea in China, 35
VT. L. REv. 689, 711 (2011) (citations omitted).
81. Id. The author adds that "[v]iewed from a Confucian perspective, this allows language and its referents
to be flexible to the needs of the speaker." Id.
82. See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 274.
83. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 29, at 8.
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and works "have held a predominant role in Chinese culture for millenniums."5 Con-
fucianism is not a religion, but a secular philosophy.86 Buddhism, with its tenets of uni-
versal compassion and tolerance, has "been the religion of the majority of the Chinese
people for centuries." 87 Buddhism does not conflict with Confucianism and its secular
code of civic values, but instead complements it.88
Confucius lived in a turbulent time of chaos, treachery, and corruption in China and
"[h]is whole effort was directed toward trying to arrest a swift decline in political practice
and public morality."89 Through his own exemplary life and works, Confucius "left be-
hind a new understanding of ethics, an ideal of the aristocrat as a man of morality: just,
sincere, loyal, benevolent, and owing his high esteem to the possession and practice of
these virtues, not to his birth or wealth."90 "Man must be guided by morality, by virtues,
and not just by the knowledge of how to perform rites." 91 Harmony is a core principle of
Confucianism, and secular ethics and morality are crucial to maintaining harmonious soci-
etal relationships. 92 "As Confucius saw it, maintaining the harmonious functioning of the
social order was-or ought to be-the supreme objective of any man's life."93
84. Id. See also FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 65.
85. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 65. Confucius's The Analects also known as The Lun Yd, "is a
record of Confucius' personal teaching, compiled by his original disciples." Id. "Only the Analects can be said
to be the work, albeit indirectly, of Confucius himself. It is a collection of his sayings and teaching, and is
accepted as basically the work of his immediate disciples, although it was probably expanded in later times,
perhaps from oral tradition. Almost all that is certain about Confucius' life and teaching comes from the
Analects. The greatness of Confucius does not rest upon the attributed authorship or editorship of well-
known works, but on his method and his approach to moral problems." Id.
86. See, e.g., id. at 183 ("Unlike China's two other great systems of thought-Buddhism and Taoism-which
were essentially contemplative and largely mystical, Confucianism [is] profoundly activist and so secularly
oriented that it can scarcely be described as a religion."). See also JAMES MANNION, ESSENTIALS OF PHILOSO-
PHY: THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST THINKERs 178 (2006); and THoMAs FRONCEK,
THE HORIZON BOOK OF THE ARTS OF CHINA 39 (1969) ("Confucianism, which dominated Chinese thought
after the second century B.C., is more of a code of ethics than a religion. Its followers do without priests,
images or deities-although Confucius himself is sometimes worshipped as a sage.").
87. GAvIN MENZIEs, 1421: THE YEAR CHINA DISCOVERED AMERICA 39 (2002).
88. See id.
89. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 67; see also MANNION, supra note 86, at 177 ("[Confucius]
lived in a time of chaos and corruption in ancient China, and his philosophy stressed the ethical in interper-
sonal and political relations and family values. ... The leaders should be of exemplary moral fiber .. . .").
90. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 20; see also MANNION, supra note 86, at 178 (Confucius
"concluded that five virtues were what one needs to live a good life: compassion, decency, good manners,
insight, and fidelity.").
91. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 65. See also Edward J. Romar, Globalization, Ethics, and
Opportunirm: A Confucian View of Business Relationships, 14 Bus. ETHIcs Q. 663, 667 (2004) ("Confucianism is
based upon the virtues of trust, honesty and benevolence and is relational and hierarchical."); and Shafer et
al., Values and the Perceived Importance of Ethics, supra note 39, at 267 ("Several distinct values are associated
with Confucian dynamism, including persistence (perseverance), personal steadiness (reliability), ordering re-
lationships, thrift, a sense of shame, respect for tradition, protecting your face, and reciprocation.") (citations
omitted).
92. See, e.g., Lei Wang & Heikki Juslin, The Impact of Chinese Culture on Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Harmony Approach, 88 J. Bus. ETHIcs 433, 440-41 (2009) ("Harmony is [Confucianism's] central principle,
the overall goal of ancient Confucianism being to focus on secular ethics and morality, and educate people to
be self-motivated and self-controlled to assume responsibilities, which leads to self-cultivation and a harmoni-
ous society.").
93. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 183.
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"As a virtue ethic, the Confucian Way governs all aspects of human behavior and ethics
cannot be separated from any individual activity."94 Reciprocity and reciprocal virtuous
behavior are key virtues in Confucianism. 95 Through its concern with reciprocity and
social harmony, "Confucianism focuse[s] on the structure and the needs of the society at
large." 96
In looking out for the needs of the society at large, individuals following the Confucian
way embrace "a deep moral concern and altruistic commitment towards others and soci-
ety." 97 Included in this societal concern is a sense of "distributive justice," which "implies
a fair acquisition and distribution of resources."98 It also includes the principle of "non-
maleficence."99
After the firm establishment of the Han dynasty in 206 B.C., "Confucians won the
leading place in the esteem of the new emperors, and Confucianism became the orthodox
doctrine of the Chinese world."oo Today, more than 2,000 years later, the traditional
values of Confucianism still "are ingrained in the Chinese way of life and affect Chinese
people's perceptions of what is important and what is not."10 Confucianism continues to
be "a dominant and enduring influence on cultural values in China despite the economic
94. Romar, supra note 91, at 668.
95. See, e.g., Wang & Juslin, supra note 92, at 442 ("Confucianism believes that virtuous behavior towards
others lies in reciprocity.... Confucius called reciprocity as 'shu,' which thought is the fundamental moral
principle which could guide a person through life, saying: 'never impose on others what you would not
choose for yourself' ") (CoNfucIus, ANALECTS 15:24); Gary Kok Yew Chan, The Relevance and Value of Con-
fucianism in Contemporary Business Ethics, 77 J. Bus. ETucs 347, 353 (2008) ("According to the ANALECTS
(Book VI, Number 28), the person who abides by the principle of reciprocity is a man of humanity."); Frrz-
GERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 183 ("Every man was also under a moral, legal, and social obligation to
practice jn, or 'human heartedness,' in his dealings with others. Jin-or 'virtue of the soul,' as it was also
known-was the central concept of Confucianism."); and Joseph P. Schultz, Reciprocity in Confucian and
Rabbinic Ethics, 2 J. RELIGIOUS ETHics 143, 144 (1974) ("Reciprocity is the basis for all human relations in
the Confucian social order . . . Confucius himself expressed the idea of mutuality in social relationships
96. FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 183.
97. D. F-C. Tsai, The Bioethical Principles and Confucius' Moral Philosophy, 31 J. MED. ETHIcs 159, 161
(2005). The Confucian also "values his relatedness, mutuality, and communion with others more than his
own separateness, individuality, and distinctiveness." Id. Indeed, "(w]hen there are conflicts between public
interest and self interest, individual benefits and moral principles, yi as justice maintains the prioritization of:
first, justice; second, profit (first, the public interest; second, the self interest) according to Confucius." Id.
See also Karyn Lai, Understanding Confimaan Ethics: Reflections on Moral Development, 9 AUSTL. J. PROF. &
APPLIED ETHICs 21, 24 (2007) ("Confucian moral development involves the cultivation of a deep commit-
ment to human welfare.").
98. Tsai,supra note 97, at 161. Confucian values required that "[rielieving people's poverty ought to be
handled as though one were rescuing them from fire or saving them from drowning. One cannot hesitate."
THE DICIONARY OF MING BIOGRAPHY 338 (L. Carrington Goodrich ed., 1976). For several excellent
critiques of how far modem America has fallen from such an idea, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF
INEQUALYTY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2012); see also KEVIN PHILLIPS,
THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFTER-
MATH (1991).
99. Tsai,supra note 97, at 161. "[N]on-maleficence is a perfect duty that everyone should not transgress,
while beneficence is a moral ideal . . . ." Id.
100. KOTKER & FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 75.
101. George Lan, Zhenzhong Ma, JianAn Cao & He Zhang, A Comparison of Personal Values of Chinese Ac-
counting Practitioners and Studens, 88 J. Bus. ETHICS 59, 62 (2009).
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and political upheavals in the last two centuries."1 02 As an example, in the 1990s, when "a
small number of older [Communist] ideologues [sought] to resuscitate Mao's ideas," a
larger group of Chinese scholars and young individuals instead turned back to the shared
Confucian values they credited for the Asian economic miracles of the 1980s and 1990s. 0 3
Western philosophies long have admired and praised Chinese Confucian morality and
ethics. For example, the eighteenth century French Jesuits urged "that the ethical content
of the Confucian Classics proved the Chinese were a deeply moral nation."104 Voltaire
even went so far as to assert that the morality and ethics of the Chinese showed "it was
obviously possible for a country to get along admirably without the presence of Catholic
clerical power."105 Even earlier, in 1699, the German mathematician and philosopher
Gottfried William Liebniz asserted the superiority of the Chinese and their Confucian
culture and ideals to western ethics and politics.106 The Dutch scholar Isaac Vossius and
the Flemish Jesuit Father Nicholas Trigault similarly praised the Chinese for their peace-
fulness and their conduct toward neighboring countries.107
In understanding and assessing the current western criticisms of China's AML and its
enforcement, it is crucial to appreciate how different Chinese Confucianism and morals
are from the current American neoclassical economic and individualistic philosophies that
largely have driven American antitrust enforcement since the 1980s.10 In the United
States, some scholars have argued that antitrust should have no ethical or moral compo-
102. Id.
103. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 441.
104. SPENCE, mspra note 29, at 133.
105. Id.
106. See ARTHUR 0. LovEjoY, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 105 (Capricorn Books ed. 1960). Liebniz
wrote in part, "we now experience in the case of the Chinese .. . be it said almost with shame-we are beaten
by them-that is, in the principles of Ethics and Politics. For it is impossible to describe how beautifully
everything in the laws of the Chinese, more than in those of other peoples, is directed to the achievement of
public tranquility, to that good order in the relations of men to one another whereby each is in the least
degree injurious to the others." Id. at 105-06 (quoting GorrFRIED WILLiAM LIEBNIZ, NovIssIMA SINICA
(trans., 2d ed., 1724)). Liebniz went on to recommend and promote the project of a joint Chinese-European
Academy of Science, in which Western philosophies would be compared to Chinese Confucianism. He
urged, "If this should be carried out, I fear lest we soon be inferior to the Chinese in everything that is
deserving of praise. I say this, not because I envy them any new light-on that I should rather congratulate
them-but because it is to be desired that we, on our side, should learn from them those things which hitherto
have, rather, been lacking in our affairs, especially the use of practical philosophy and an improved under-
standing of how to live.... I believe that if a wise man were chosen to pass judgment, not upon the shapes of
goddesses, but upon the excellence of peoples, he would award the golden apple to the Chinese ..... Id. at
126.
107. LoVEov, supra note 106, at 104-05 (quoting IsAAc Vossius, VARIARUM OBSERVATIONUM LIBER
(1685)); NicoLAs TRIGAULT, PURCHAS His PILGRIMES (1625). Father Trigault wrote, "neither the [Chi-
nese] king nor his subjects ever think of conquering other nations. They are content with what is theirs and
do not covet what belongs to others." Id. at 104.
108. See, Lan et al., supra note 101, at 62 ("[Confucianism] differs substantially from Western philosophical
ways of thinking and behaving and is at the philosophical basis for the collectivist and power distance values
prevalent in China.").
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nent.109 Neoclassical economists believe that society is best served by each individual and
corporation acting in his or her own selfish interests. 0
Such western neoclassical economic thinking is diametrically opposed to Chinese Con-
fucianism and China's historical social values and morals. Consequently, Chinese regula-
tors are unlikely to build their AML enforcement activities around conservative
neoclassical economic theories. The Chinese long have feared the breakdown of general
ethical standards and the dangers of "unbridled individualization."1II Quite simply, the
Chinese Confucian Way views ethics and morals as intrinsic to all human behavior, in-
cluding economic and competitive endeavors.112
Many Chinese rightfully fear and believe "that the transition to a market-based econ-
omy has been characterized by behavior that is less than ethical and socially irresponsi-
ble.""13 Such fears and tensions epitomize a longstanding Chinese fear of "'spiritual
pollution,' a term designed to suggest the extent of the damage wrought by decadent
influences from the West."'14 In response to such insecurities, fears, and tensions, in
2005, Premier Hu Jintao "launched a nationwide campaign to promote a 'harmonious
society,' stressing the traditional Confucian values of moderation, benevolence, and bal-
ance, in an apparent effort to counter the sharpening social tensions caused by the eco-
nomic reforms."1S In light of such ongoing developments, it seems safe to assume and
predict that China is unlikely to renounce its historic Confucian values and ideals in favor
of conservative neoclassical economic theories in interpreting and enforcing its AML.
2. Virtue, Morality, and Law in Chinese Culture
Since the firm and deep establishment of Confucianism more than 2,000 years ago, the
Chinese have strongly believed in the importance of morality and virtue in all walks of life,
including the political and social. China long has been "under the sway of the great Con-
fucian myth of the state, government by virtue."" 6 Since a Confucian leader rules by
109. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrnst Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609 (2003)
("[Alntitrust has no moral content."); see also Mlaurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 Sr.
JOHN's L. REV. 951, 989 (2008).
110. See Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 9, at 506 ("utility-maximizing consumers interacting amorally
with profit-maximizing businesses will lead to the promised land of allocative efficiency."). Interestingly,
Adam Smith did not share the neoclassical economists' views that competition should be unfettered and
follow the maxims of Social Darwinism. Smith believed that "people are naturally cooperative and sympa-
thetic, and that their self-interest naturally includes concern for others and their opinions." ROBERT C.
SOLOMAN, ETiiCS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BusiNEss 86 (R. Edward Free-
man ed., 1992). For Smith, "self-interest must always be kept in balance with benevolence and other moral
sentiments." Id. at 87.
111. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 29, at 17 (describing how Chinese scholars during the Ming Dynasty
"concluded that the corruption sprang from a breakdown of the general ethical standards ... and from the
growth of an unbridled individualism.").
112. See, e.g., Romar, supra note 91, at 668 ("As a virtue ethic, the Confucian Way governs all aspects of
human behavior and ethics cannot be separated from any individual activity.").
113. Shafer et al., supra note 39, at 268.
114. SPENCE, supra note 29, at 699.
115. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 468.
116. See id. at 109. The authors add, "The central myth of the Confucian state was that the ruler's exem-
plary and benevolent conduct manifesting his personal virtue (de) drew the people to him and gave him the
Mandate." Id. at 111.
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virtue of moral goodness, he or she must continually seek the moral approval of the Chi-
nese people.1 17 Confucius's emphasis on the moral and ethical conduct of the ruler and
his government was "different from anything in the West."IIs
Over the course of China's history, the rule of Confucian virtue and ethics has tended
to trump the rule of law in Chinese political thought.1 9 In the early years of Confucian-
ism, the rule of virtue was opposed by "The School of the Law" philosophy and its follow-
ers, the "Legists."l20 The Legists taught that strict laws rather than Confucian virtue
should control the people.121 Intense opposition to the Legist philosophy helped bring
the Han dynasty to power "and forever discredited the School of Law."122
Under the Confucian rule of virtue, right conduct, not the law, allowed a Chinese ruler
to maintain power.123 The Chinese ruler was accountable "to a supreme moral force that
guides the human community."l 24 Thus, when China's last great dynasty, the Qing, came
to power in the mid-seventeenth century, they recognized the need to "preserve the social
and political order of imperial Confucianism," and "integrate [their] rule with Chinese
culture in mutual dependence." 25 As described by noted historians Susan Naquin and
Evelyn Rawski, "[L]uan was the disorder that could arise within the state, the community,
the household or the individual when ethical norms and correct ritual were not followed.
The desire to promote order and prevent luan permeated Chinese society from top to
bottom." 26
Following Confucian virtue and moral precepts, the Chinese have written their history
for thousands of years with "a moral purpose-to warn contemporaries by holding up the
117. Id. at 154 ("Another strength of Confucian government lay in its constantly seeking the moral approval
of the people governed."); id. at 52 ("Right conduct gave the ruler power.").
118. Id. at 52. Many Chinese scholars blamed the collapse of the Ming dynasty in the mid-seventeenth
century on "the extreme individualism and belief in innate moral knowledge that had been so popular in the
late Ming." SPENCE, sipra note 29, at 102.
119. See, e.g., Castellucci, svpra note 22, at 48 (arguing that the "rule of virtue" "is an important concept in
the Confucian tradition of the art of government, as opposed to ruling by the force of the law"); id. at 48, n.59
("[In the general principles contained in the T'ang Imperial Code of Laws of year 624, a fundamental rule of
govemment is that virtue and rites are the basis for the government, law and punishment are its instruments,
in a typical rule-by-law conception." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. See KOTKER & FfrZGERALD, supra note 20, at 71.
121. See id. at 71-72.
122. See id. at 72. Although the teaching of the Legist School was eventually repudiated, "[Ilegist thought
remained an influence in Chinese society. It made the law a hated word, and as a result, China developed no
civil law. Law was confined to the criminal branch, where it retained much of the severity and cruelty of
Legist practice . . . . It can be said that while later China adopted Confucianism as the ethical and moral basis
of society, it retained some Legist concepts in the actual practice of government." Id.
123. See id. at 52. Confucius is quoted as saying, "[wlhen a prince's personal conduct is correct, his govern-
ment is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but
they will not be followed." CoNFucius, ANALECTS, supra note 95, at 13.6. More recently, in 2002, in a
Resolution adopted in the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP, the Constitution of the CCP was
amended to include a reference to "combining the rule of law with the rule of virtue." See Castelluci, supra
note 22, at 47.
124. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, sutpra note 19, at 40. "Unlike a Western ruler's accession ... the Chinese
theory of Heaven's mandate set up moral criteria for holding power." Id.
125. Id. at 154.
126. Id. (quoting SUsAN NAQUIN & EVELYN RAwvsa, CIrN'ESE SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
92 (1987)); see also KOTKER & FIrZGERALD, supra note 20, at 78 ("The reward of moral virtue was prosperity;
the penalty for vice was disaster.").
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sad example of past follies and vices and to encourage them with examples of virtue and
wisdom."127 Even today, "legitimacy in China is still tied to the idea that the government
should be the defender of a moral order." 28
China's modern legal system today is still "a work in progress." 29 Over the past thirty-
five years, "China has engaged in what is perhaps the most rapid development of any legal
system in the history of the world."' 30 China amended its Constitution in 1993 as part of
its economic reform process and declared, "[tlhe State practices a socialist market econ-
omy."' 31 To help expedite its development as a global market player, "China has been
making efforts to build itself into a country under laws that fit into the global market." 32
In creating its modern legal system, China and its government understand that they
must not lose sight of China's long history and culture. Within China today, therefore,
"[i]ncreased commitment to the regularization that law brings exists side by side with a
system that remains susceptible to popular demands and appeals to popular morality and
local custom." 33 In other words, Confucian morals and ethics continue to be as valid and
important as ever to China's rulers and their legal and regulatory systems.
The Chinese long have believed that honoring and adhering to Confucian ethics and
morals will lead to a better and more harmonious society. Chinese core Confucian values,
such as fairness and justice in economic competition, while currently considered mushy
127. KOTKER & FITZGERALD, supra note 20, at 12. ("All history depended on the moral qualities of the
monarch. . . . [i]f there were calamities, they resulted from the moral defects of the king or emperor. If there
was a recovery, it could be traced to the merit of the ruler, inspired by the teaching of the Sages. The result
of this moral preoccupation in presenting historical record was to view the processes of human affairs as a
series of cycles: rise, splendor, decline, and fall.") Id. at 14.
128. Pye, The State and the Individual, supra note 43, at 461. "[I]f there is a decline in moral standards, the
state is directly at fault." Id.
129. Pittman B. Potter, Legal Refom in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation, 29 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 465, 486 (2004).
130. Liebman, supra note 15, at 18. Professor Liebman further notes, "[t]he Chinese legal system has been
fundamentally transformed since 1978. At the beginning of the reform era there were few laws or trained
personnel. Today, China has sophisticated legal institutions, thousands of laws and regulations, and the third
largest number of lawyers in the world. Law has begun to regulate both state and individual behavior in ways
that were inconceivable in 1978. Commitment to the rule of law has become an important part of state
ideology and state legitimacy. Popular understanding of law has expanded dramatically and the legal system
has become an important route for addressing grievances and resolving disputes." Id.
131. Wang, supra note 13, at 133.
132. Id. "China's law reform program began in late 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee of the [CCPI. The plenum reflected a tentative policy consensus about the need to reform the
state-planned economy and build a legal system that would support economic growth . . . ." Potter, supra
note 129, at 465. "The study of Chinese law has recovered and flourished since the advent of reform in 1978,
aided substantially by rapidly legislating and the increasing use of law and courts as political forums."
Jonathon Kinkel & William Hurst, Review Esray-Access to Justice in Post-Mao China: Assessing the Politics of
Criminal and Administrative Law, 11 J. E. AsIANs STUDs. 467, 468 (2011).
133. Liebman, supra note 15, at 32.
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and soft by some American antitrust practitioners, scholars, and jurists,134 are therefore
seen as non-negotiable cultural and social bedrocks for China's future.'s
C. WHY CHINA Is LIKELY TO BE GUIDED BY ITS UNIQUE CONFUcIN HISTORY
AND CULTURE IN INTERPRETING AND ENFORCING ITS AML
Western scholars and critics today are urging China to follow conservative American
neoclassical economics in interpreting and enforcing its AML. In the words of former
U.S. Antitrust AAG Hewitt Pate, "U.S. and European officials have often approached
China like a recruiting prospect-as a new player to be won over to the U.S. or European
styles of antitrust."' 36 China's long and impressive history and culture, however, ensure
that China will do what it has done throughout its long history-chart its own course.' 37
The proud Chinese will never allow themselves to become "the tail of someone else's
dog."13 8
This does not mean that China will stop studying and adopting western competition
regulation theories and ideas. It must be recognized that the western values of individual-
ism and materialism "have recently penetrated Chinese society and are having a great
influence on Chinese people's everyday life, in particular, for the young generation." 39
Imported western values vie every day with traditional Chinese Confucian values for the
attention of the Chinese populace.140 It also is true that "the issue of individualism has yet
to be resolved in Chinese culture."'41 China's youth continue to demand greater rights
and freedoms.142 Consequently, as the world continues to flatten, there can be little doubt
that China will continue to assimilate numerous aspects of Western culture.143
134. See, e.g., Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 9, at 505-507; Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note
9, at 831-37. Again, it is important to recognize that Adam Smith did not view such concepts as mushy. "In
1759, Smith began his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments by pointing to the natural human capacity for
sympathy as the rule of all morality. .. . From (our] moral sentiments, we derive the general rules of justice
and injustice." Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Conservatism, in PHILOSOPHY ATrER DARWIN: CLASSIC AND CON-
TEMPORARY READINGs 349, 350 (Michael Ruse ed., 2008).
135. China's CCP recognizes how critical the ideals of fairness and justice, among others, are to building a
successful Socialist economy with Chinese characteristics. In May 2008, China's State Council Information
Office publicly released a government white paper describing "the Chinese people's struggles for democracy,
freedom, equality, and the building of a country under the rule of law." The State Council Info. Office,
China, China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the Rule ofLaw, 7 CHINESEJ. INT'L LAw 513, 513 (2008).
The government listed "fairness and justice" as critical to China's future, as well as "safeguarding market
order and achieving social fairness and justice [inl establish[ing] an initial law regime for the socialist market
economy." Id. at 514, 517.
136. Pate, supra note 18, at 195.
137. See, e.g., FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, Sutpra note 19, at 164 ("China's modem economy when it did develop
would be to a large extent in Chinese hands.").
138. Id. at 322.
139. Lan et al., supra note 101, at 62.
140. Id.
141. Pye, The State and the Individual, supra note 43, at 466. Professor Pye believed that in China, "[the
process of working toward a new equilibrium in state-individual relations is certain to be filled with tensions,
especially as officials sense the weakening of state authority and the increasing role of the people." Id.
142. Lan et al., supra note 101, at 62.
143. Some commentators have gone so far as to say, "[ilt seems that while the West is experiencing a trans-
formation in values from a self-oriented focus to a community-oriented focus... the reverse appears to be
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One must also consider China's reputation for carefully analyzing all sides of an issue
and being ready to compromise to promote social harmony. 1" A relevant example of such
flexibility "is reflected in the compromises regularly found in the laws and regulations that
govern competition and pricing in China."145 Throughout their history, the Chinese have
"preserve[d] the most cherished aspects of their traditional culture by selectively adapting
elements of Western learning and technology to China's needs."l46 Therefore, it is likely
that China's AML interpretation and enforcement in the coming decades will include a
blend of western and Chinese philosophies and approaches.
Whatever ultimate philosophical blend China chooses, China will be guided heavily by
its Confucian traditions. Consequently, China's future AML enforcement is likely to be
based on social, moral, and political, as well as economic, considerations.147 These con-
siderations are likely to include a heavy dose of Confucian morals and ethics, as well as
broad social concerns.
As a starting point, China's leaders believe that economic and social responsibilities
exist together and cannot meaningfully be separated. 48 On September 15, 2006, then
Chinese President Hu Jintao described a harmonious Chinese society as one that "gives
full play to modern ideas like democracy, rule of law, fairness, justice, [and other social
objectives]." 49 Under this Harmonious Society policy, economic growth must be bal-
anced with tackling serious social and economic dislocations, including income inequality
between regions and within social groups, and potentially widespread corruption.150 Rec-
true for China, where greater emphasis is now being placed on the Western values of individualism and self-
awareness." Id. at 72-73.
144. See, e.g., FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 107 ("Unlike the philosopher's ideal of absolute
adherence to principle, the master of a gentry household is advised to think ahead, consider all sides, and be
ever ready to compromise."); FITZGERALD & KOTKER, supra note 20, at 116 ("There arose that peculiarly
Chinese phenomenon, the ability to hold two opposing theologies at the same time on the grounds that both
might be partly right. In any case, to the Chinese practice was much more important than theory.").
145. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 8.
146. SPENCE, supra note 29, at 216. Chinese respect for Western technological power always has blended
"with a yearning to retain some essence of Chinese culture." Id. at 313. See also id. at 224, "[iun the years after
the Sino-Japanese War, a formulation became widespread that gave philosophical reassurance to those wor-
ried about the value of 'self-strengthening': 'Chinese learning should remain the essence, but Western learn-
ing be used for practical development . . . It affirmed that there was indeed a fundamental structure of
Chinese moral and philosophical values that gave continuity and meaning to civilization. Holding onto that
belief, China could then afford to adapt quickly and dramatically all sorts of Western practices, and to hire
Western advisors."
147. In the words of former Antitrust AAG Pate, "we should not be surprised if non-antitrust values find
expression in Chinese antitrust outcomes to a greater degree than is the case in the United States or Europe."
Pate, supra note 18, at 196 (emphasis added). Missing from Pate's characterization of Chinese "non-antitrust
values" is that "[t]he history of the continuing debates as to antitrust legislation and regulation reveals that
how people think about antitrust issues is generally tied to their underlying assumptions and premises, as well
as their implied values." Thomas J. Horton, Competition or Monopoly? The Implications of Complexity Science,
Chaos Theory, and Evolutionary Biology for Antitrust and Competition Policy, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 195, 201
(2006); see also Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay in the Normative Foundations ofAntitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv.
219, 265 (1995) ("Choosing between economic theories is as much an act of politics as of science.").
148. See, e.g., See supra note 33, at 1.
149. See Harmonious Society, THE 17TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA,
(Sept. 30, 2007, 9:14 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274973.html.
150. See, supra note 33, at 2. In 2004, when then Assistant AAG Pate visited China, he recalled being told
by his hosts, "[ylou cannot understand China by visiting modern Beijing. You must see more rural areas
where many people are poor and need the benefits of economic growth." Pate, supra note 18, at 197.
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ognizing this, the CCP also issued a list of "Disharmonious elements in China (relevant to
corporations)," including the need for moral progress and "unequal income distribution
pattern[s]." 151
In addition, China aspires to create a unique humanistic legal system. "China's legal
reforms aim to create a fair system that serves both to further economic development and
to address the rights and grievances of those left behind by such development. Ensuring
social stability requires that the legal system accomplish both tasks."1 52
The Chinese government, as well as Chinese businesses and citizens, recognize that
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) will be critical to building a harmonious society
and will therefore continue to promote its development in China.iss The hope is that
"Confucian reciprocity can lead to a win-win business relationship and fair competi-
tion."154 Completely antithetical to western ideas of aggressive and even cutthroat com-
petition, fair competition in China assumes a harmonious business relationship between
competitors, as well as suppliers, customers, and partners. 55
China is likely to continue honoring and following its Confucian traditions and morals
in building its modern legal system and in interpreting and enforcing its AML. China
therefore will continue to encourage its business organizations to adopt and follow Con-
fucian moral and ethical principles. "Business organizations can benefit from Confucian
ethics and Confucianism can provide the moral guideposts necessary to overcome oppor-
tunism." 56 This Confucian approach will attempt to harmoniously balance the strive for
human virtue and profits, respectively. 5 7
151. See, supra note 33, at 3. "Selected proposed actions (relevant to corporations)" also were set forth,
including "social equity and justice as a basic condition of social harmony." Id. In China, the terms equity
and justice are an important aspect of socialist ideals. Indeed, Karl Marx's original focus on poverty as the
driving force for revolutionary dynamism ultimately shifted "from poverty to an equally objective desire for
equality and justice." Kikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt's Critique of Marx, in HANNAH ARENDT: THE RECOV-
ERY OF THE PUBLIC WORLD 67, 93 (Melvyn A. Hill, ed., 1979). China's leaders have not forgotten that a
primary reason Mao Zedong and the CCP ascended to power was that China's economic growth "had failed
to reach hundreds of millions of people." See SPENCE, supra note 29, at 431.
152. Liebman, supra note 15, at 31.
153. For an excellent discussion of the history of CSR in China, see Wang & Juslin, supra note 92, at
433-47. The authors argue that "the Western CSR concepts cannot fit the Chinese market well, and CSR
concepts have to take Chinese cultural contexts into consideration to be widely disseminated in China and
understand better by Chinese corporations and society." Id. at 435.
154. Id. at 443.
155. Id. at 444.
156. Romar, supra note 91, at 672. Romar adds: "Confucianism provides the guidance necessary to manage
ethically the tension between self-interest and cooperation so necessary to the development and maintenance
of successful and moral organizations." Id.
157. See Chan, supra note 95, at 351. It is important to recognize that Confucianism does not attack profit-
making unless it is "for selfish purposes and not for the good of the community." Id. at 350. Neoclassical
American economics conversely follows conservative economist Milton Friedman's view that the only societal
responsibility is to maximize efficiencies and to earn profits (subject to compliance with the rule of law). See
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133-36 (40th anniversary ed. 2002). For several recent
Western scholarly opinions differing with Friedman's view, see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH: How PUrTNG SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2013); Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good are Shareholders? HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 2012.
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III. China's Emerging Approach to Interpreting and Enforcing
China's AML
Slowly but surely, American antitrust seems to be moving in the direction of more
aggressive antitrust enforcement 58 and away from the neoclassical Chicago School eco-
nomic theories that have dominated American antitrust enforcement since the 1980s.15 9
Welcome developments include, among others, influential American antitrust scholars
mounting aggressive attacks against exclusionary conduct by dominant firms;I1o question-
ing the current delineation of relevant markets in antitrust cases;16' recommending the
fostering of a moral component to antitrust crimes;162 arguing for more aggressive regula-
tion of monopsonies;163 urging an increase in our shared moral outrage over antitrust
violations; 64 applying truly conservative economic models to limit the growth of concen-
trated private economic power; 65 and proposing dramatically increased fines for cartel
violations.166
This author previously has proposed applying evolutionary theories to structural and
behavioral antitrust issues.167 This part discusses how China's obeisance to traditional
Confucian morals, ethics, and ideals is consistent with the evolutionary theory. Looking
at both behavioral (I.A.) and structural competition (III.B.) issues, it is recommended
that China continue to follow and apply evolutionary principles in interpreting and en-
forcing its AML.
158. See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton, The New United States Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Devolution, Evolution, or
Counterrevolution? 2 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACT. 158, 158 (2011) (contending that the 2010 revisions
to the United States' 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines "portend a potentially dramatic and perhaps even
counterrevolutionary shift in the enforcement visions and goals of the current [U.S. antitrust] Agencies, and a
pronounced convergence towards the EC's Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers.").
159. See, e.g., Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 825 ("Economics rules antitrust today. Jurists
and scholars favoring 'consumer welfare' considerations and disfavoring fairness considerations in antitrust
are ascendant."); Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust's Goals, supra note 68, at 563-66 (discussing ascendance of
Chicago School's neoclassical economic theories in American antitrust jurisprudence since the late 1970s);
Markham, supra note 68, at 281 ("Post-Chicago antitrust theory departs from the Chicago School views
mostly around the margins."); Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDozo L. REV.
367, 385 (2009) ("[M]any commentators urge we are all Chicago School now and that the Chicago School has
absorbed most of the competing approaches.").
160. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 527 (2013); C.
Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L). 1182 (2013).
161. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets? 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010).
162. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 443 (2006) [hereinafter
Stucke, Morality and Antitrust].
163. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L. J. 1509 (2013).
164. See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Anti-
trust, 78 ANTITRUST L. J. 201, 216-19 (2012).
165. See, e.g., James W. Brock, Economic Power, Henry Simons and a Lost Antitrust Vision of Economic Conserva-
ticm, 58 S.D. L. REv. 443 (2013).
166. See, e.g., John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy, 34 CARDozo L.
REV. 427 (2012).
167. See Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 823; Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9, at
615; Horton, Coming Extinction, supra note 9, at 469.
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A. CHINA'S EMERGING EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO BEHAVIORAL COMPETITION
ISSUES
1. Confucianism and Fair Market Competition
Although Confucianism "has had to weather [an] onslaught of criticisms," many Chi-
nese believe that Confucianism has played a key role in helping China achieve its global
economic successes. 16 8 Today, China and the CCP believe that "fair market competition"
is essential in "protecting the consumer and public interests, [and] promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy."1 69 The CCP consistently has emphasized
"fairness and justice" as keys to a successful socialist society.170 Consequently, "[a] major
concern for Chinese competition policymakers has been the potential for 'excessive' or
'malignant' competition."'71 Confucian morality traditionally has decried selfishness and
greed "as an antisocial evil."1 72 "Unbridled individualism" and a "breakdown of the gen-
eral ethical standards" have been viewed as a recipe for corruption and chaos.173 Many
Chinese intellectuals long have been "appalled by the social evils of unbridled capitalism
and extreme individualism in the West."174 Such fears and concerns have catalyzed calls
for "policies that ensure all market participants have a level competitive field." 7 s
Both Articles 1 and 5 of the 2008 AML specifically highlight and emphasize the need
for fair competition.176 Such pronouncements are consistent with "[t]he Confucian ap-
168. See, e.g., Chan, supra note 95, at 347.
169. See Zh6nghui r6nmin g6ngh6gu6 fan l6ngduan fa ( A.RA MW #) [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz 68, ch. II, art. I (China).
170. See The State Council Info. Office, surpra note 135, at 2.
171. HORTON & HUANG, supra note 1, at 10. See also Bruce M. Owen, Su Wen & Wentong Zheng, China's
Competition Policy Refsrms: TheAnti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 247 (2008) (discussing
the widespread fear of excessive competition in China).
172. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 258-59. The authors explain, "[w]estern political thought
had built up the concept of interests-the personal desires and goals of individuals and groups in their inevita-
ble competition with one another.... Not so in China. Interests were by definition selfish, and Confucian
morality decried selfishness as an antisocial evil." Id. One of China's greatest novels, Golden Lots, which was
published anonymously in the early 1600s, can be read "as a moral fable of the way greed and selfishness
destroy those with the richest opportunities for happiness . . . ." SPENCE, supra note 29, at 10.
173. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 29, at 17.
174. Fung, State Building, supra note 35, at 320; see also Chan, supra note 95, at 350 (arguing that "[t]he
dangers of extreme capitalism riding roughshod over ethics are real."); Thomas B. Edsall, Our Broken Social
Contract, N.Y. TIMEs (June 19, 2013, 10:05 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/our-bro
ken-social-contract/?_r=0 (discussing the view that "lc]orporate America has abandoned its commitment to
the commonwealth over the past three decades. It no longer honors norms of fairness and equality ... it is in
the economic sphere that American integrity has been eroded and its ideals corrupted.").
175. Hongbin Cai & Qiao Liu, Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial
Firms, 119 EcoN. J. 764, 794 (2009).
176. See Zh6nghu6 rinmn g6ngh6gu6 an l6ngduim f () [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ 68, ch. I, art. 1, 5 (China).
(Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China Article 5 states, "Undertakings may, through fair
competition and voluntary alliance, implement concentration, expand business scale and improve their mar-
ket competitiveness according to law.").
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proach, [which] suggests that one should adopt a proper focus towards the striving for
human virtue and profits, respectively."N7 7
On December 1, 1993, approximately fifteen years before the implementation of its
AML, China passed its Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL).17s Enacted to help the
transition from a state-planned to a socialist market economy, the AUCL "was the first
landmark legislation regulating competition in China." 79 "The stated purpose of the
AUCL is to encourage and protect fair competition, prevent unfair competition practices,
and protect the legal rights and interests of business operators and consumers."180 The
express and unequivocal language in both the AUCL and the AML shows how serious
China is about ensuring "fair competition." A review of China's recent China Competi-
tion Bulletins (CCB), published by China's Competition Research Center, further drives
this home.' 8'
China's objectives of competitive fairness on a level, competitive playing field are fully
consistent with evolutionary norms of fairness. Today, "evolutionary biologists, behav-
ioral economists, and legal and business scholars are coming to appreciate how fundamen-
tal and critical humans' innate sense of fairness has been to our long-term evolutionary
and economic success."' 82 We have evolved to care deeply about the fairness of exchange
177. Chan, supra note 95, at 351.
178. HARRIS ET AL., supra nOte 1, at 331.
179. Id.
180. Id. Article 1 of the AUCL states, "[t]his Law is formulated with a view to safeguarding the healthy
development of [the] socialist market economy, encouraging and protecting fair competition, repressing un-
fair competition acts, and protecting the lawful rights and interests of business operators and consumers."
Zh6nghui rinmin g6ngh6gu6 fan bi zhingdlng jingzheng fa (9 ALE [Anti Unfair
Competition Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Sep. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) 1993 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 92, art. 1
(China). Article 2 (AUCL) adds in part, "[a] business operator shall, in his market transactions, follow the
principles of voluntariness, equality, fairness, honesty, and credibility and observe the generally recognized
business ethics." Id. art. 2.
181. See, e.g., CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 (25th ed. 2013) ("The principles of openness and transparency,
fair competition, impartiality, and good faith are to be observed in government procurement. China's gov-
ermnent procurement system provides general rules on competition, transparency, and fairness."); CHINA
COMPETITION BULL. 2 (17th ed. 2012) (discussing how the new Rules on Retailing Fees were promulgated
"for the purpose of maintaining market order and fair trading and promoting the healthy development of the
retail industry"); CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 1 (12th ed. 2011) ("The draft Internet Information Service
Rules contain 22 articles and prohibit Internet information services from engaging in conduct that may dam-
age the legal rights of their competitors and consumers."); CHINA COMPETITlON BULL. 1 (8th ed. 2011)
(The Service Codes for E-Commerce Third Party Transaction Platforms forbid "imped[ing] the legitimate
interests of other business operators and consumers."); CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 5 (7th ed. 2011) (dis-
cussing the State-Owned Enterprises Research Project Conference and Academic Seminar, and observing
that Chinese Competition Professor Xiaoye Wang "noted that the AML should be equally applied to SOEs,
private enterprises, and multinational companies to promote fair competition and improve the market econ-
omy system in China"); see also CHINA COMPETITION BULL. 4-5 (20th ed. 2012) (discussing MOFCOM's
conditional approval of Google's acquisition of Motorola Mobility with the requirement that "Google must
honour Motorola Mobility's existing commitment to license its patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discrimi-
natory terms").
182. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 839-40; see also EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE:
THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 325 (1998) ("we are leaming the fundamental principle that ethics is every-
thing"); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND CREATION OF PROSPERITY 152 (1995)
("We often take a minimal level of trust and honesty for granted and forget that they pervade economic life
and are crucial to its smooth functioning."); MARK BEKOFF & JESSICA PIERCE, WILD JUSTICE: THE MORAL
FALL 2013
218 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
relationships,183 and a moral sense of fairness is hard-wired into our brains.18 4 "Multidis-
ciplinary studies confirm 'that most of us do have a bias toward cooperation and a readi-
ness to reciprocate-a sense of fairess."185
China's focus on fair competition dramatically distinguishes it from the United States.
In the United States today, "[flor many American jurists and scholars, the notion that
antitrust and competition law should incorporate moral norms of fairness is anathema." 186
Many American competition lawyers and economists today view fairness as a "non-anti-
trust value." 87 The Chinese disagree.'18 Ironically, while most commentators see China
as racing to struggle and catch the United States in competition law, China has the poten-
tial to set a progressive leadership tone for antitrust and fairness in the twenty-first
century.
What are some of the practical implications of China following evolutionary norms of
fairness in interpreting and enforcing its AML in the coming years? The first is that
China is likely to be much more aggressive in addressing exclusionary competitive behav-
ior than the United States has been over the last forty years. 89
In the United States, "[a]ntitrust commentators associated with the Chicago School
have long expressed deep skepticism about exclusion as an antitrust theory, particularly as
applied to dominant firm conduct."190 In modern American jurisprudence, "[i]t is axio-
matic that predatory pricing cases are highly disfavored in antitrust ... [and] it has become
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to win a predatory pricing case." 191
Following Confucian ideals and evolutionary theory, China is likely to choose a differ-
ent path from the United States in regulating exclusionary competitive behavior. Both
China's AUCL and AML take dim views of predatory pricing. As an example, Article 11
of China's AUCL prohibits businesses from selling goods below cost for the purpose of
forcing out competitors, except in severely limited circumstances.1 92 Article 11 applies
LIVEs OF ANIMALS xii (2009) ("Cooperation, fairness, and justice have to be factored into the evolutionary
equation in order to understand the evolution of social behavior in diverse species.").
183. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHERMER, THE MIND OF THE MARKET: COMPASSIONATE APES, CoMPETrITIVE
HUMANS, AND OTHER TALES FROM EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICs 176 (2008); BEKOFF & PIERCE, supra note
182, at 134 ("Our informed guess would be that justice and a sense of fairness have evolved out of the more
basic repertoire of cooperative and altruistic behavior.").
184. See, e.g., SHERMER, supra note 183, at 113 ("The moral sense of fairness is hardwired into our brains
and is an emotion shared by all people and primates tested for it.").
185. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 841 (quoting PETER CORNING, THE FAIR SOCIETY AND
THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 196 (2011)).
186. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 823-24.
187. See Pate, supra note 18, at 196.
188. Seventh Circuit Judge and former academic Frank Easterbrook has asked, "[w]ho says that competition
is supposed to be fair?" Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 577 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The simple answer to Judge Easterbrook's question may be more
than a billion Chinese.
189. Exclusion "encompass[es] both the complete foreclosure of rivals or potential entrants and conduct that
disadvantages rivals without necessarily inducing them to exit." Baker, supra note 160, at 527 n.1.
190. Id. at 528. Professor Baker adds, "[e]xclusionary conduct is commonly relegated to the periphery in
contemporary antitrust discourse, while price fixing, market division, and other forms of collusion are placed
at the core of competition policy." Id. at 527.
191. Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 853.
192. Zh6nghui r6nmin g6ngh6gu6 fan bii zhangding jingzhEng fa E [Anti
Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l Peo-
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even where "the undertaking in question does not have a dominant position." 93 Nor does
Article 11 require "the existence of negative effects on competition."19 4
Similarly, China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) Anti-
Price Monopoly Laws, promulgated in accordance with China's AML, have the goals of
protecting fair market competition, and safeguarding the interests of the consumers and
the public.195 The Rules forbid "price monopoly conduct," including any use of pricing
means by an undertaking with a dominant market position to eliminate or restrict market
competition.196
Importantly, neither the AUCL nor the AML and its accompanying rules appear to
require a showing of anticompetitive intent in carrying out exclusionary pricing or other
conduct.'97 Nevertheless, proof of anticompetitive intent is likely to carry great weight
with China's AML regulators and courts, as such intent is inconsistent with the overall
tenor of the AML and China's Confucian traditions. Such a policy accords with evolu-
tionary theory and economics, which urges that antitrust regulators should pay increased
attention to both evolutionary norms of fairness and anticompetitive intent in exclusionary
cases.198
Western critics undoubtedly will argue that China is jumping onto a slippery slope in
seeking to evaluate such subjective factors as competitive fairness and anticompetitive in-
tent in interpreting and enforcing its AML.199 They will characterize such notions as
hopelessly subjective and lacking any meaningful economic guidance. 200
The Chinese, as they have done to date, should resist such criticisms. Through their
long history, which has included numerous invasions and intrusions by outsiders, China
has learned that human predatory behavior can be shockingly and unconscionably real and
dangerous. 201 In the words of Harvard psychology Professor Steven Pinker, "[h]uman
nature accommodates motives that impel us to violence, like predation, dominance, and
ple's Cong., Sep. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993) 1993 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 92,
art. 11 (China).
193. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 339.
194. Id.
195. See Zh6nghui rinmin g6nghigu6 fin 16ngduin fli [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'i People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ 68, ch. H, art. 1 (China).
196. Id. art 3. See also id. art. 6 ("Undertakings with dominant market positions shall not abuse their domi-
nant provisions to eliminate or restrict competition."); id. art. 17(2) ("Undertakings [with] dominant market
positions are prohibited from.. . [s)elling products at prices below cost without any justification)."
197. See, e.g., HARRIS ET AL., supra note 1, at 339 ("Article 11 [of the AUCL] does not require the existence
of negative effects on competition. In addition, the 'purpose of forcing out competitors' may be implied from
the conduct of below-cost selling.").
198. See Horton, Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 845-5 1; Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9,
at 654-55; Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J. L. EcON. & POL'Y 801 (2012) [hereinafter Stucke, Is
Intent Relevant?].
199. For a detailed discussion of "the case against fairness" in antitrust, see Horton, Fairness and Antitrust,
supra note 9, at 829-35.
200. See id. at 831.
201. In Nanjing, for example, during the Japanese invasion in World War II, "there was no transcendental
moral code . . . [and] Chinese were killed in every conceivable manner, including being crucified, savaged by
dogs, bayoneted to save ammunition or beheaded." BURLEIGH, supra note 36, at 19.
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vengeance.... When an opportunity does arise to eliminate a hated opponent with little
danger of reprisal, a Darwinian creature will seize on it."202
Unlike America's Chicago School, the Chinese do not accept that a rational competitor
will never engage in predatory economic conduct against a rival unless it can receive full
recoupment of its costs later on.203 Evolutionary theory provides support for such a view.
Professor Pinker has pointed out how predatory violence in human societies is often
irrational. 204
In his seminal article on social norms and roles, 205 Professor Cass R. Sunstein explained
how "[a] good deal of governmental action is self-consciously designed to change norms,
meanings, and or roles, and in that way to increase the individual benefits or decrease the
individual costs associated with certain acts." 206 Governments and regulators often em-
ploy euphemisms, such as "the reframing of a harm in words that somehow make [a harm-
ful act] feel less immoral."207 Displacement of responsibility, derogating the victim, and
moral distancing additionally can be employed to justify harmful acts.208
Employing economic terms and phrases like consumer welfare, efficiencies, recoup-
ment, and "protecting competition-not competitors," America's Chicago School has suc-
cessfully established amoral norms justifying and encouraging dangerous predatory and
exclusionary economic conduct.209 In changing America's moral norms, Chicagoans have
202. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 483, 487
(2011).
203. E.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993) (No
recovery for predatory pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act on primary-line price discrimination
under the Robinson-Patman Act without a showing "that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost prices.").
204. See PINKER, supra note 202, at 511. Professor Pinker explains, "[t]hough predatory violence is purely
practical, the human mind does not stick to abstract reasoning for long.... As soon as the objects being
preyed upon take protective measures in response, emotions are likely to run high. . . . In these cases the
predator's state of mind may shift from dispassionate means-ends analysis to disgust, hatred, and anger. As
we have seen, perpetrators commonly analogize their victims to vermin and treat them with moralized dis-
gust. Or they may see them as existential threats and treat them with hatred, the emotion that, as Aristotle
noted, consists ofa desire not to punish an adversary but to end its existence." Id. Professor Pinker contin-
ues, "[tlhere is a second way self-serving biases can fan a small flame of predatory violence into an inferno.
People exaggerate not just their moral rectitude but their power and prospects, a sub-type of self-serving bias
called positive illusions." Id.
205. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
206. Id. Professor Sunstein adds, "[t]hus government might try to inculcate or to remove shame, fear of
which can be a powerful deterrent to behavior. The inculcation of shame operates as a kind of tax; the
removal of shame might be seen as the elimination of a tax or even as a kind of subsidy." Id.
207. PINKER, supra note 202, at 565 - 66. See also George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, HoRI-
ZON, Apr. 1946, at 252 (describing how governments can cloak atrocities in bureaucratese).
208. See PINKER, supra note 202, at 566-68.
209. Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9, at 622, 669; see Coming Ertinction, supra note 9, at 517-21; John B.
Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2469 (2013); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FoRDHAMi L. REv. 2349, 2402 -
2403 (2013).
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allowed dominant firms and monopolies to behave unfairly while taking "detached, amoral
stance[s] towards [their] harmful act[s]."210
To their credit, the Chinese are choosing an evolutionary path, rather than a neoclassi-
cal economic one, in seeking to instill and promote evolutionary norms of fairness in
economic competition. The Chinese are to be applauded for following their noble Con-
fucian traditions in seeking to discourage anticompetitive exclusionary and unfair conduct
by competitors.
2. Confucian Ethics and Morals and Corporate Social Responsibility
Recent antitrust scholarship has addressed the evolutionary importance of morals and
ethics and their importance to future antitrust enforcement. 211 Morality and ethics are
crucial to our ability to build and maintain exchange markets.212 Recent anthropological
research shows that "moral norms across the world cluster around a small number of
themes." 213 In the simple words of noted evolutionary biologist Edward 0. Wilson, "we
are learning the fundamental principle that ethics is everything." 214
While Chicago School adherents in the United States believe that antitrust is amoral
and should include no moral components,215 recent scholarship has urged that it is time to
reincorporate morality into America's antitrust laws.216 Fortunately, societal concern for
ethical behavior appears to be on the rise today.217 "Over the past fifteen to twenty years,
there has been increased academic and practitioner interest in and concern with ethical
210. PINKER, supra note 202, at 495. "Even in matters when no reasonable third party can doubt who's right
and who's wrong, we have to be prepared, when putting on psychological spectacles, to see that evildoers
always think they are acting morally." Id. at 494.
211. See, e.g., Coming Ertinction, supra note 9, at 508-14; Morality and Antitrust, supra note 162, at 505-23.
212. See Coming Ertinction, supra note 9, at 510; RICHARD LIEcEY & ROGER LEWIN, OlUGINs RECONSID-
ERED: IN SEARCH OF WHAT MAKES Us HUMAN 350 (1992) (discussing how the social skill of cooperation
evolved into "a set of rule of conduct, or morals, an understanding of right and wrong in a complex social
system"); Joseph Heinrich et al., Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punish-
ment, Sci., Mar. 19, 2010, at 1484 (discussing the importance of ethical norms in building societies).
213. PINKER, supra note 202, at 624.
214. WILSON, supra note 182, at 325. Wilson adds, "[hluman social existence, unlike animal sociality, is
based on the genetic propensity to form long-term contracts that evolve by culture into moral precepts and
law. . . . We . . . have discovered which covenants are necessary for survival, and we have accepted the
necessity of securing them by sacred oath." Id. at 325 - 26.
215. See generally PINKER, supra note 202. Professor Pinker observes, "[tlhe unease with which we read these
rationalization [by wrongdoers] tells us something about the very act of donning psychological spectacles....
[I]n the attempt to understand harm-doing, the viewpoint of the scientist or scholar overlaps with the view-
point of the perpetrator. Both take a detached, amoral stance toward the harmful act. . .. The viewpoint of
the moralist, [however], is the viewpoint of the victim." Id. at 495.
216. See, e.g., Coming Extinction, supra note 9, at 514 ("We need explicit ethical codes to rein in the inexora-
ble temptations in business to win by any means possible.... Only through such a morals-based evolutionary
biology and ethics approach can we hope to emphasize that we will not tolerate anticompetitive actions that
trammel the competitive process."); Sokol, supra note 164, at 216 - 219 ("Moral outrage and shame have a
place in cartel enforcement as it creates its own form of deterrence."); Morality and Antitrust, supra note 162,
at 546-47 ("Although antitrust scholars, policymakers, enforcers, and courts have divorced morality from
antitrust, ... it is time to bring morality into the debate.").
217. See, e.g., Ge & Thomas, sipra note 30, at 190 ("Societal concern for ethical behavior is also on the
rise.").
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issues in business." 218 One advantage of such societal concerns is that "[a]lthough devel-
oping a moral norm and educating society about it may have high fixed costs, once that
moral norm is internalized, self-policing reduces enforcement costs." 219
The Chinese do not view competition or their AML as amoral. "Mandarins were
steeped in Confucian ethics and a code of moral values intended to maintain order and
hierarchy in society by eliminating the opportunity for people to disturb the tao (interac-
tion of natural forces)." 220 Indeed, many throughout China and Asia are proclaiming the
importance of Asian values while seeking to resist "the moral failings of Western socie-
ties." 221 While American antitrust regulators and courts simply have accepted and em-
braced the amorality of our antitrust laws, the Chinese have sought to "sharpen the rigor
of the intellectual tools needed to analyze the efficacy and morality of political actions," 222
including the interpretation and enforcement of their AML laws.
While neoclassical economists may cringe at the idea of a fair and orderly marketplace,
the Chinese embrace such a concept as part of their Confucian moral traditions. There-
fore, we should not be surprised to see repeated references in China's AML and competi-
tion regulations to a "socialist market economy" that includes a "united, open, and orderly
market system." 223 The AML also requires state-owned enterprises to act "in good faith,
with strict self-discipline, [and] subject themselves to the supervision from the to public
supervision." 224
Rather than viewing business and commercial morality and ethics as an impediment to
creating consumer welfare, the Chinese believe that CSR can enhance the global competi-
tiveness of China's businesses. 225 Today, "CSR is becoming a tool for improving the com-
218. Singh et al., supra note 49, at 86. The authors add, "[t]he number of journals and conferences related to
ethics has also increased significantly, and ethics tracks are now common at most business conferences. Busi-
ness ethics is a topic of concern to the general public as well. In the past few years, .. . the American public
has become interested in and concerned with the condition of corporate ethics. This increased interest in
ethics is a worldwide phenomenon." Id.
219. Morality and Antitrust, supra note 162, at 514. See also Fairness and Antitrust, supra note 9, at 845 ("Our
potential for intense shared moral outrage can encourage better behavior and fairness in social dealings.").
220. MENZIES, supra note 87, at 50.
221. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 431. See also Civility, supra note 55, at 763 (Voices in China
"now are proclaiming that 'Asian values' are different from Western ones, and that economic growth can
occur without the individualism associated with pluralistic democracy.").
222. SPENCE, supra note 29, at xx.
223. See Zh6nghus rinmin gbnghigu6 fan 16ngduin fa (9 L0I TIM4) [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz 68, ch. II, art. 4 (China).; see
also Id. art. 11 ("Industry association shall improve self-discipline in the relevant industries, lead the undertak-
ings in the relevant industries to compete in accordance with laws and maintain the orders of market
competition").
224. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG. GAz. 68, art. 7; see also Pearson, supra note 62, at 312 (discussing China's regulatory "preference for
'orderly' competition"); Id. at 314 (discussing how the Chinese "continued to regard unfettered competition
as harmful and decided accordingly that competition in strategic, state-owned industries should be 'or-
derly'"). Professor Pearson additionally observes, "[a] major CCP statement on the economy issued in 2003
reiterated that the state should 'restrain disorderly competition,' a goal voiced repeatedly in statements by
regulators in both network industries and financial services." Id.
225. E.g., Wang & Juslin, supra note 92, at 437 ("The Chinese government, enterprises, and society have
realized that developing CSR is an important contribution to building a harmonious society, and have taken a
series of positive actions to promote its development in China").
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petitiveness of the Chinese enterprises in the global market."226 Consistent with the
morality requirements of China's AML, China's 2006 PRC Company Law similarly re-
quires that "a company shall accept social responsibility, and not only comply with the
laws and administrative regulations, but also observe social morality and business
ethics." 227
The western proponents of neoclassical economics may belittle China's efforts to im-
pose morality and ethics upon its businesses. But in following evolutionary theory in
drafting its AML's requirements of fairness and ethical behavior, China may be onto
something. Rather than turning a blind eye to predatory and exclusionary conduct by
dominant firms, as the United States has done, it seems that China recognizes that mo-
nopolies and dominant firms can and must be controlled. In the words of Steven Pinker,
Dominance is an adaptation to anarchy, and it serves no purpose in a society that has
undergone a civilizing process or in an international system regulated by agreements
and norms. Anything that deflates the concept of dominance is likely to drive down
the frequency of fights between individuals and wars between groups. That doesn't
mean that the emotions behind dominance will ever go away-they are very much a
part of our biology-but they can be marginalized.228
China and its AML deserve substantial praise for seeking to marginalize economic domi-
nance and unfair exclusionary and predatory behavior by adhering to Confucian ethical
and moral norms.
B. CHINA's EMERGING EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO STRUCTURAL COMPETITION
ISSUES
China's recent 2011 census estimated that China has approximately 1.34 billion people,
or nearly 18 percent of the world's population.229 This population is dispersed through-
out a vast nation that is still far from being a fully integrated or homogeneous country.230
While many westerners may view China as fairly homogeneous, China actually is a nation
of tremendous economic diversity and variation. "China's vast expanses [have] allowed for
endless variations in such areas as pace of economic change, types of lineage organization,
efficiency of transportation, religious practices, sophistication of commerce, and patterns
of land use and landholding." 231
Economic scholars have identified nine historic economic regions within China, each
embracing parts of several provinces, and having a core "defined by heightened economic
activity in major cities, high population density, and comparatively sophisticated transpor-
226. Id.
227. Id. at 438. Cf Eabrasu, supra note 30, page 437 (arguing that corporations should "differentiate them-
selves from their competitors on the complex map of morality by building their own moral identity").
228. PINKER, supra note 202, at 528.
229. See NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, COMUNIQUr OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS OF PEOPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON MAJOR FIGURES OF THE 2010 POPULATION CENSUS(l]
(No. 1) (2011); NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF STATISTICS OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON MAJOR FIGURES OF THE 2010 POPULATION CEN-
sus[1] (No. 2) (2011).
230. See, e.g., SPENCE, supra note 29, at 90.
2 3 1. Id.
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tation networks."232 "[E]ach core was surrounded by a periphery of less populated and
developed areas."233 Historic tensions between regional and central authorities and of
crosscutting bureaucratic lines has added to such regional economic diversity.234
China's dazzling economic diversity is further fueled by the entrepreneurial spirit of its
citizens. In China's bustling cities, vast numbers of small businesses exist alongside the
towers of industrial and corporate giants. The excitement of a thriving and diverse econ-
omy fills the air. In 2012, China overtook the United States to become the biggest trad-
ing nation in the world.235
Unlike the United States, where growing economic consolidation seems to be a general
rule,236 Chinese economic reforms since the late 1970s have actually strengthened a trend
in China towards economic decentralization. 237 "Official statistics indicate that market
concentration ratios in China have been unusually low when compared to both developed
and developing countries."238
A number of scholars credit China's industrial decentralization "with creating the con-
ditions for China's economic success since the late 1970s."239 Yet, many western critics
heavily criticize China's economic decentralization and low market concentration ratios.
They decry Chinese industry as economically inefficient,240 lacking in scale economies, 241
232. Id. at 91.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 524 (Professor Spence adds that when the CCP took power, such tensions "which had in various
ways plagued China since the late Ming dynasty, were not going to be eradicated in any simple way").
235. Haley & Haley, supra note 73 (The authors additionally observe, "[s]ince 2000, the value of Chinese
exports [have] more than quadrupled. In 2009, China surpassed Germany to become the world's largest
exporter. In 2010, it overtook Japan to become the second-largest manufacturer, and its foreign-exchange
reserves became the largest in the world.").
236. See generally WALTER A. ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR,
AND GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (2d ed. 2004); BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010); TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA:
THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 100 (2005) (discussing the "rapidly
accelerating trend to concentration" as a result of a "lenient policy on mergers"); KENNETH M. DAVIDSON,
MEGAMERGERS: CORPORATE AMERICA'S BILLION-DOLLAR TAKEOVERS (2003).
237. See, e.g., Zheng, supra note 18, at 656; Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, Why China's Economic Reforms
Difer: The M-Form Hierarchy and Entry/Expansion ofthe Non-State Sector, 1 ECON. TRANSITION 135, 145 - 47
(1993); YINGYI QiA.N, TETSUYA KATAOKA & BARRY R. WEINGAST, CHINA'S TRANSITION TO MARKETS:
MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISM, CHINFSE STYLE 10-21 (1995).
238. Zheng, supra note 18, at 659, 710 (Professor Zheng adds, "[b]etween the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s,
the average market concentration ratio for the largest one hundred firms in various sectors hovered between
ten and sixteen percent. In the mid-1990s, in eighteen out of thirty-nine major sectors, the largest eight firms
in each sector accounted for less than ten percent of the market share . .. (Mlost of China's industries, with
the exception of the monopoly industries, are characterized by small-scale firms and low market concentra-
tion ratios"); see also Kennedy, supra note 27, at 26-27 (discussing the low concentration "by international
standards" for "many ... industries in China"); MINxIN PEI, CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSrnION: THE LIMrrs
OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY 258 n.148 (2006) (citing Qi LUDONG, ECONomiC STUDIES ON MONOP-
OLIES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 146-48 (1999)).
239. Zheng, supra note 18, at 657; see also Qian & Xu, supra note 237, at 152-56 (arguing that China's
decentralized industrial structure allowed flexibility and opportunities for regional economic experiments,
which helped spur the emergence of China's thriving non-state economic section); Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform
and the Economic Foundation of Local State Cooperation in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 102 (1992) (discussing
how China's economic reforms encouraged local development).
240. See, e.g., Haley & Haley, supra note 73 ("The state has willingly paid the price of economic inefficiency
to accomplish political, social, economic, and diplomatic goals"); HOWELL ET AL., supra note 1, at 90 ("Chi-
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and plagued by excess capacity.242 One scholar even has argued that "a compelling expla-
nation for the widespread failure of Chinese price cartels is the extremely low concentra-
tion of production in Chinese industries." 243
Industrial decentralization and deconcentration in China is not an accident. It is un-
doubtedly true that China is still plagued by concentrated SOEs, 244 which it must con-
tinue to reform and deconcentrate. On the other hand, China continues to show a keen
interest in protecting the long-term health and economic opportunities of smaller com-
petitors.245 As an example, AML Article 15(3) expressly exempts from its coverage mo-
nopolistic agreements if their aim is "improving operational efficiency and enhancing the
competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises." 246 Other sections of China's
AiL show a similar solicitude for the health and well being of smaller Chinese business
enterprises. 247 While the United States during the 1980s was zealously implementing
Chicago School economic theories allowing massive economic consolidations, 248 the Chi-
nese policymakers have expressed concern that in many domestic industrial sectors, Chinese enterprises are
too small to achieve the economies of scale necessary to complete internationally on an equal footing with
large foreign enterprises").
241. See, e.g., Haley & Haley, supra note 73 ("Production came mostly from small companies that possessed
no scale economies"); ZHENG, supra note 18, at 659 ("The duplication of industries at the provincial level and
the resulting low economies of scale led to generally low market concentration ratios in China").
242. See, e.g., Haley & Haley, supra note 73.
243. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 26.
244. A discussion of China's SOEs and China's ongoing efforts to reform and rein them in is beyond the
scope of this article.
245. See, e.g., Horton & Huang, supra note 6, at 101.
246. See Zh6nghui r6nmin g6ngh6gu6 fan l6ngduin fl ( [Anti-Monopoly Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz 68, ch. II, art. 15(3) (China).
247. See, e.g., id. arts. 1 (protecting fair market competition), 4 (protecting open and competitive markets), 5
(protecting fair competition), 6 (forbidding dominant undertakings from abusing their market positions "to
eliminate or restrict competition"), 11 (allowing trade associations to "maintain the order of market competi-
tion"), and 17 (forbidding numerous specified abuses of dominant market positions). China is not alone in
recognizing the importance of protecting competitive opportunities. South Africa's Competition Act of
1998, for example, states that one of the purposes of its competition law is "to ensure that small and medium-
sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy." Competition Act 89 of 1998
§ 2(e) (S. Afr.). Ironically, in its Aid to Small Business Act, the United States Congress stated, "[tlhe essence
of the American economic system of private enterprise is free competition. Only through full and free com-
petition can free markets, free entry into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth of per-
sonal initiative and individual judgment be assured. The preservation and expansion of such competition is
basic not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this Nation. Such security and well-being
cannot be realized unless the actual and potential capacity of small business is encouraged and developed. It is
the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is
possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise." 15 U.S.C.
§ 631 (2010).
248. See generally HoW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHoT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
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nese were aggressively encouraging local government support of grass-roots enterpriseS249
and working to develop independent zones of enterprise. 250
More recently, in 2010, former Premier Jiabao Wen announced that China was going
to accelerate the reform of monopoly industries to further encourage and promote fair
competition among private- and state-owned enterprises. 251 Indeed, "[p]ressure to in-
crease market competition for China's state-owned enterprises has come from the highest
levels of government." 252
At the same time, however, the Chinese government has repeatedly made it clear that it
does not wish to allow excessive, harmful, unfettered, or unfair competition. 253 The Chi-
nese government unashamedly and unabashedly has announced its intentions to "develop
a united, open, competitive, and orderly market system." 254 A major CCP statement on
the economy issued in 2003 reiterated that the state should restrain disorderly competi-
tion.255 As previously discussed, such objectives mesh with traditional Confucian notions
of a harmonious and fair society.
Such policies and ideals deeply trouble some conservative competition scholars.256
They see China as following the "wrong turns by U.S. antitrust policy in the past."257 Are
the Chinese really so misguided in seeking to guard entrepreneurial opportunity and en-
hance fair competition on a level playing field? Maybe not. At least one study has posi-
tively shown "that for non-state-owned Chinese firms, corporate ownership dispersion is
249. See, e.g., FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 408. (China's then Premier Deng Xiaoping saw
such encouragement of small business enterprises as part of a program of reforms called "Socialism with
Chinese characteristics.") A key goal was to adopt Western technologies and economic methods "while still
maintaining the traditional Confucian state and values." Id. Indeed, simultaneously with such economic
reform programs, the CCP issued "a blanket condemnation of what was called 'spiritual pollution; a term
designed to suggest the extent of decadent influences from the West." SPFNCE, supra note 29, at 699.
250. See SPENCE, snpra note 29, at 732. Gavin Menzies notes that "[t]he Chinese were always careful to
respect local sensibilities[.]" MENZIES, supra note 87, at 133.
251. See Kexin Li, Antitrust Compliance Programs in China: Experiences frsm Practice 11 (Am. Antitrust Inst.,
Working Paper No. 13-5, 2013).
252. Pearson, supra note 62, at 314. Professor Pearson adds, "[clompetition, officials argue, will help firms
to become more efficient and profitable." Id. "To enhance competition in the last decade, the Chinese gov-
ernment [also] has spun-off state-owned monopolies from government industries and broken them up." Id. at
315.
253. See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 62, at 314.
254. See, e.g., See Zh6nghui rinmin gbnghigu6 fan l6ngdum fa ( LY#705317Il#) [Anti-Monopoly
Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat'1 People's Cong., Aug. 30,
2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ 68, ch. H, art. 4 (China).
255. Pearson, supra note 62, at 314 (quoting Xinhua, Speech at the Third Plenum of the 16th Party Con-
gress: Decision on Perfecting the Socialist Market Economic Decision (Oct. 2003)).
256. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 76, at 301 ("Lack of strong political commitment to robust competition laws,
while clinging to fuzzy notions of fairness, can reduce the predictability of Asian competition law enforce-
ment"); Zheng, supra note 18, at 720 ("In sum, despite having a Western-style antitrust law, China has not
developed and likely will not develop Western-style antitrust jurisprudence in the near future due to these
local conditions."); Howell et al., supra note 1, at 95 ("The areas of divergence from U.S. anttrust practice
recall an earlier era in the United States, when antitrust was an expression of popular anxieties, political and
social values, and a system of economic regulation."). Carl Riskin went so far as to describe China's economic
policies as a "crippled hybrid." FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 398.
257. Howell et al., supra note 1, at 95.
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positively associated to CSR."258 Thus, corporate power dispersion in China may well aid
in achieving the Confucian ideal of a harmonious society.
In addition, modem evolutionary theory calls into question the current extreme Ameri-
can "judicial tolerance of monopolies and predatory conduct," which "views monopolies as
'an important element in the free market system,' and believes that monopoly pricing
allows dominant firms to engage in risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth." 259 Evolutionary theory counsels that competitive diversity enhances an ecosys-
tem's overall fitness and leads to increased overall adaptability, resilience, and stability.260
Therefore, evolutionary theory counsels that, "we should protect healthy and stable com-
petition by guarding competitors against [predatory and exclusionary] antitrust violations,
and by pursuing merger policies that promote and protect variation and diversity rather
than concentration." 261
In 1945, Judge Learned Hand boldly stated, "[i]t is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his suc-
cess upon his skill and character, to one in which the greater mass of those engaged must
accept the direction of a few." 262 Five years later, the United States Senate observed in
passing the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments to the Clayton Act,
While there exist many differences of opinion on other aspects of the monopoly
problem, there is substantial agreement that the level of economic concentration is
extremely high . . . The enactment of the bill will limit further growth of monopoly
and thereby aid in preserving small business as an important competitive factor in the
American economy. 263
The Chinese appear to be aspiring and attempting to follow more closely the admoni-
tions of Judge Learned Hand and the 1950 United States Senate than the neoclassical
economic theories of the Chicago School in their AML's regulation of structural competi-
258. Wenjing Li & Ran Zhang, Corporate Social Responsibility, Ownership Structure, and Political Interference:
Evidence from China, 96J. Bus. Enncs 631 (2010). The authors point to additional work documenting that
Chinese firms "smaller in size, non-state-owned, producing traditional goods, and located in poorer regions
are more likely to have managers who opt for a higher CSR rating in China." Id. at 633.
259. Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9, at 615-16 (quoting Rudolph J.R. Peritz, COMPETITION
POLICY IN AMERICA: 1888-1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 239 (1996) (quoting Richard A. Posner, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 28 (2d ed. 2001))); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
260. Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9, at 644-45. See also Scorr E. PAGE, DIVERSIY AND
COMPLEXITY 8-10 (2011) ("First, diversity often enhances the robustness of complex systems ... systems that
lack diversity can lose functionality. . . . Second, diversity drives innovation and productivity ... we should
not be at all surprised that productivity correlates with diversity"); WILSON, supra note 182, at 322 ("The
more species that live in an ecosystem, the higher its productivity and the greater its ability to withstand
drought and other kinds of environmental stress").
261. Horton, Antitrust Double Helix, supra note 9, at 646; see also HORTON, Coming Extinction, supra note 9, at
489 ("Therefore, it should not surprise us to find a positive correlation between economic diversity and
overall economic growth").
262. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cit. 1945) (Hand, J.).
263. S. REP. No. 81-1775 (1950); see also Comment, The Amendment to Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 46 ILL. L.
REv. 444, 445 (1951) ("It may be stated that the purpose of the Amendment's proponents was clearly to halt
what they considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration"); Thomas J. Horton, Fixing Merger
Litigation "Fixes": Reforming the Litigation of Proposed Merger Remedies Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55
S.D. L. REv. 191-94 (2010) (discussing the passage of the 1950 Amendments to the Clayton Act).
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tion issues. In so doing, they are following modern evolutionary theory and their own
traditional Confucian values and norms. Rather than portraying their AML and early
competition efforts as misguidedly pursuing "non-antitrust values," perhaps we should
begin seeing them as progressive and enlightened.264
IV. Conclusion
China today faces a daunting array of complex economic, social, and political issues.
Critics will continue to question China's ability to enjoy the economic fruits of capitalism
through a "socialist market economy" dedicated to ensuring "fair market competition"
and widespread economic opportunity. Furthermore, China will have to come to grips
with pursuing such lofty goals while dealing with economic and political corruption in a
one-party political system dominated by the CCP. No easy answers or solutions await
China. As it has done for thousands of years, however, China will call on its long tradi-
tions of Confucian ethics and morals in seeking to build and sustain a harmonious society
and economy.
China's AML reveals China's continuing commitment to honoring and following its
traditional Confucian ethics and morals. Western critics have failed to appreciate that
China's AML purposely aspires to follow an evolutionary, rather than a western neoclassi-
cal economic approach, in regulating behavioral and structural competition issues in
China. As a result, continuing cries for China to get in step with western neoclassical
economic theory are likely to fall on deaf ears.
China should be commended for the courage and boldness of its emerging evolutionary
approach to Anti-Monopoly Law. Rather than succumb to western neoclassical economic
pressures and criticisms, China should continue to seek to instill and inspire evolutionary
norms of Confucian morality, ethics, fairness, and reciprocity in economic competition.
China also should continue to emphasize the importance of economic diversity, variation,
and multiplicity in addressing structural competition issues. Should China continue fol-
lowing its emerging evolutionary approach to competition, China ironically may find itself
in a leadership position in the global antitrust and competition law arena, as the founder of
antitrust, the United States, struggles to overcome forty years of largely misguided neo-
classical economics and regain its economic soul.
264. See Zinzho Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, 6 J. Com-
PETITION L. & ECONs. 477 (concluding that "[b]ased on the experience of the merger enforcement agency, it
seems that China's government is on its way to building a reputation for committing to a sound competition
policy"); Adrian Emch, Antitrust in China-The Brighter Spots, 3 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 132, 138 (2011)
("While China clearly has a long way to head in its path to become a mature and globally-recognized antitrust
jurisdiction, at least in a few of MOFCOM's merger-control investigations and a number of court cases, the
authority and courts have followed-to some extent-an internationally accepted framework for their analy-
sis"); Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, China's Merger Control Policy: Patterns of New Developments,
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L: AsiA ANITRUST COLUMN 3 (2011) ("Although it has received some criticism
from scholars and practitioners, and has indeed much room for improvement, MOFCOM has been on the
right track to build an independent and transparent merger review system").
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